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ABSTRACT 
The Optical Bust Switching (OBS) network has become one of the most 
promising switching technologies for building the next-generation of internet 
backbone infrastructure. However, OBS networks still face a number of security 
and Quality of Service (QoS) challenges, particularly from Burst Header Packet 
(BHP) flooding attacks. In OBS, a core‎ switch ‎handles requests, reserving one of 
the unoccupied ‎channels for incoming‎ data bursts (DB) through BHP. An 
attacker can exploit this fact and ‎send malicious BHP without the corresponding 
DB. If unresolved, threats ‎such as ‎BHP flooding attacks can result in low 
bandwidth utilization, limited ‎network ‎performance, high burst loss rate, and 
eventually, denial of service (DoS). ‎In this dissertation, we focus our 
investigations on the network security and QoS in the presence of BHP flooding 
attacks. First, we proposed and developed a new security model that can be 
embedded into OBS core switch architecture to prevent BHP flooding attacks. 
The countermeasure security model allows the OBS core switch to classify the 
ingress nodes based on their behavior and the amount of reserved resources not 
being utilized. A malicious node causing a BHP flooding attack will be blocked 
by the developed model until the risk disappears or the malicious node redeems
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 itself. Using our security model, we can effectively and preemptively prevent a 
BHP flooding attack regardless of the strength of the attacker. In the second part 
of this dissertation, we investigated the potential use of machine learning (ML) in 
countering the risk of the BHP flood attack problem. In particular, we proposed 
and developed a new series of rules, using the decision tree method to prevent 
the risk of a BHP flooding attack. The proposed classification rule models were 
evaluated using different metrics to measure the overall performance of this 
approach. The experiments showed that using rules derived from the decision 
trees did indeed counter BHP flooding attacks, and enabled the automatic 
classification of edge nodes at an early stage. In the third part of this dissertation, 
we performed a comparative study, evaluating a number of ML techniques in 
classifying edge nodes, to determine the most suitable ML method to prevent 
this type of attack. The experimental results from a preprocessed dataset related 
to BHP flooding attacks showed that rule-based classifiers, in particular decision 
trees (C4.5), Bagging, and RIDOR, consistently derive classifiers that are more 
predictive, compared to alternate ML algorithms, including AdaBoost, Logistic 
Regression, Naïve Bayes, SVM-SMO and ANN-MultilayerPerceptron. Moreover, 
the harmonic mean, recall and precision results of the rule-based and tree 
classifiers were more competitive than those of the remaining ML algorithms. 
Lastly, the runtime results in ms showed that decision tree classifiers are not only 
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more predictive, but are also more efficient than other algorithms. Thus, our 
findings show that decision tree identifier is the most appropriate technique for 
classifying ingress nodes to combat the BHP flooding attack problem. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation  
The Optical Burst Switching (OBS) network is a promising switching 
technology for building the next generation of Internet infrastructure. It typically 
represents a trade-off between two switching technologies: optical circuit 
switching (OCS) and optical packet switching (OPS). Even with all the OBS's 
network merits, such as resiliency, bandwidth/resources efficiency, and overall 
economic advantages, OBS networks still suffer from several quality of service 
(QoS) and security issues, such as burst loss due to bursts contention, bursts 
scheduling, and most importantly, Denial of Service (DoS) due to Burst Header 
Packet (BHP) flooding attacks. 
A BHP flooding attack can subjugate the core switches by sending a large 
number ‎of BHPs into the network. Normally, when a core switch receives a BHP, 
it ‎reserves a WDM channel for it and changes the status of the reserved ‎channel 
from unoccupied to occupied. Attackers use this to flood the network ‎with 
malicious BHPs without sending the corresponding data. The target node
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will ‎blindly reserve a new WDM channel for each incoming malicious BHP 
without ‎checking if the corresponding data arrives. When a legitimate request 
comes to ‎the compromised core switch, there will be no unoccupied WDM 
channels available. ‎This leads to preventing legitimate nodes from reserving the 
required network ‎resources at the intermediate core switch [2], eventually 
causing a DoS ‎attack.‎ 
The main motivation for this research is to examine the behavior of ‎edge 
nodes to ‎counter the risks associated with BHP flood attacks in OBS 
networks. ‎This can develop efficient security techniques that can manage the 
problem, as well as providing ‎contributions to enhance the QoS in OBS network. 
Furthermore, we ‎aim to examine the applicability of ‎machine learning (ML) to 
the problem of BHP flooding attacks in ‎OBS networks. This is to develop a more 
efficient detection system enabling the core ‎switches to classify ingress nodes in 
an automated manner, and identify misbehaving ‎ones as ‎early as ‎possible. To 
achieve this, we extensively investigated various ML techniques ‎that adopt 
different ‎learning approaches to the research problem considered. We seek ‎to 
identify the most relevant ML ‎technique(s) to solve the issue of BHP flooding 
attacks, ‎in addition to revealing the reasons behind the ‎relevancy.‎ 
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1.2 Problem Overview 
1.2.1 Countering Burst Header Packet Flooding Attacks in Optical Burst 
Switching Networks 
The study of detection techniques of BHP flooding attack is very limited 
for OBS networks. This type of attack, which relies on the flooding approach, has 
been studied in traditional DoS against the TCP protocol [9, 10]. For instance, the 
SYN flooding attack intends to exhaust the resources of the TCP/IP stack (e.g. the 
backlog) of the victim host by generating enormous numbers of SYN requests 
towards it without completing a connection setup. The victim host will be unable 
to accept legitimate connection requests if its backlog is fully occupied by all the 
fake half-opened connections [11]. However, in the context of UDP protocol over 
an OBS network, there is no such study on preventing or even limiting BHP 
flooding attacks that we are aware of. Therefore, it is important to be able to 
monitor or study the behavior of edge nodes in an OBS network in the likelihood 
of dealing with such threats.  
In this part of the study, we propose and develop a new security 
system ‎that can be added to OBS core node architecture to prevent BHP ‎flood 
attacks. The countermeasure security system allows the ‎OBS core node to classify 
the ingress nodes, based on both their ‎behavior, and the amount of reserved 
resources not ‎being utilized. A malicious node causing a BHP flooding ‎attack 
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will be blocked by the system until the threat is resolved. ‎The system is 
implemented, tested and verified using a modified ‎NCTUNS simulator. The 
analysis shows that this is highly effective ‎in preventing BHP flooding attacks, as 
well as in providing the ‎network resources for the legitimate nodes. ‎ 
1.2.2. Decision Tree Rule Learning Approach to Counter Burst Header Packet 
Flooding Attacks in Optical Burst Switching Networks 
Machine Learning (ML) is a widely adopted and powerful data analysis 
technique which has displayed a highly predictive performance in multiple 
application domains, due to its ability to discover useful hidden knowledge that 
can be beneficial for decision making. However, a key challenge in adopting ML 
to counter BHP flood attacks is the unavailability of the training datasets. 
Therefore, this study is two-fold. Firstly,‎it‎determines‎and‎develops‎a‎dataset‎from 
thousands of ‎simulation runs that can be converted into a classification task. 
Secondly, it‎ investigates the use of a predictive model using ML to counter the 
risk of BHP flooding attack dilemmas experienced in OBS networks, proposing a 
tree-based decision architecture as an appropriate solution. 
Few related studies have used ML techniques within OBS networks [40, 
50]. These studies centred on data traffic identification, whereas our study is 
concerned with an entirely different issue – BHP flooding attacks. To the best of 
our knowledge, this study is the first to offer proposals and to develop a 
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decision-tree method of classification to solve the issue of BHP flooding attacks 
in OBS networks. Since previous studies have not used ML as a way of blocking 
misbehaving edge nodes which send DBs in OBS networks, we believe a solution 
is needed in order to address this critical issue in the initial phases of BHP 
flooding attacks. 
1.2.3 Detecting BHP-Flooding Attacks in OBS Networks: A Machine Learning 
Prospective 
A powerful and promising approach in identifying misbehaving edge 
nodes causing BHP flooding attacks is Machine Learning ‎(ML), and in particular, 
classification techniques. A classification technique learns models by applying 
them to a large historical ‎dataset derived from an edge node’s performance 
during a simulation run. The dataset contains behavior traces from a number ‎of 
edge nodes, with respect to input data characteristics, sensitivity, efficiency 
performance, predictive performance, and model ‎content. The learned model can 
then be utilized to single out (classify) misbehaving edge nodes based on their 
future ‎performance as accurately as possible, hence disciplining them. Therefore, 
this part of the study investigates the BHP problem ‎by evaluating a number of 
ML techniques in classifying edge nodes, and determines the most suitable 
method to prevent this ‎type of attack.  
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This study evaluates Decision Tree (C4.5), Bagging, Boosting (AdaBosst), 
Probabilistic (Naïve Bayes), ‎Rule Induction (RIpple DOwn Rule Learner-RIDOR), 
Neural Network (NN-MultilayerPerceptron), Logistic Regression, and ‎Support 
Vector Machine-Sequential Minimal Optimization (SVM-SMO) on a real dataset 
to identify the most appropriate method(s) to combat the BHP flood attack 
problem in OBS networks. ‎ 
1.3 Overview of Dissertation 
We will address some of the problems facing OBS networks. The 
organization of this dissertation is as follows:  
Chapter 2 provides a background on BHP flooding attacks, and proposes 
a new security model, the node classifier, to counter BHP flooding attacks. We 
implemented a sophisticated data structure comprised of two layers, with the 
use of an adaptive sliding range window to classify ingress nodes into three 
varieties. This classification is based on the number of lost bursts from each 
ingress node during the time frame, to measure the performance of nodes and 
detect BHP flooding attacks at preliminary classes. The simulation results show 
that our proposed classifier is effective in preventing BHP flooding attacks. 
Chapter 3 investigates the applicability of the predictive model, using ML 
to counter the risk of BHP flooding attacks experienced in OBS networks, and 
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proposing a decision-tree based architecture as an appropriate solution. This 
architecture contains a learning algorithm that extracts novel rules from tree 
models using data processed from several simulation runs. Our simulation 
results show that the rules derived from our learning algorithm are able to 
accurately classify 93% of the BHP flooding attacks into either Behaving (B) or 
Misbehaving (M) classes. Moreover, the rules can further categorize the 
Misbehaving edge nodes into four sub-class labels of Misbehaving-Block (Block), 
Behaving-No Block (No Block), Misbehaving-No Block (M-No Block), and 
Misbehaving-Wait (M-Wait) with 87% accuracy. The results clearly show that 
our proposed decision-tree model is a viable solution in comparison to decisions 
undertaken by expert domains or human network administrators. 
Chapter 4 builds on our previous work from Chapter 3. One method 
to ‎prevent a BHP flood attack is to detect the misbehaving edge nodes 
overloading ‎the network with malicious BHPs, and take the proper action to 
secure and ‎sustain the QoS performance in an OBS network using ML. This 
chapter ‎investigates the BHP flood attack problem by evaluating a number of 
ML ‎techniques in classifying edge nodes, and determines the most suitable 
method ‎to prevent this type of attack. To be precise, we evaluate Decision Tree 
(C4.5), ‎Bagging, Boosting (AdaBosst), Probabilistic (Naïve Bayes), Rule 
Induction ‎(RIpple DOwn Rule Learner-RIDOR), Neural Network (NN-
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‎MultilayerPerceptron), Logistic Regression, and Support Vector Machine-
‎Sequential Minimal Optimization (SVM-SMO) on a real dataset to identify 
the ‎most‎ effective‎ method(s) to combat the BHP flood attack problem in 
OBS ‎networks. 
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CHAPTER 2 
COUNTERING BURST HEADER PACKET FLOODING ATTACK IN OPTICAL 
BURST SWITCHING NETWORKS 
2.1 Background  
Optical network is a modern network technology for transmitting 
information from one place to another by sending light through an optical fiber. 
The light forms an electromagnetic carrier wave that is modulated to carry 
information [1]. These features of optical networks provide high speed and huge 
bandwidth, which make optical networks a viable choice of the Internet 
backbone infrastructure [1]. The popularity of optical networks has led to the 
replacement of traditional copper wires by optical network fibers, and has also 
motivated many enterprises to invest in optical burst switching (OBS) network in 
particular within the past few years.   
OBS network is a promising switching technology for building the next-
generation Internet infrastructure [2, 3, 4]. It represents a trade-off between two 
switching technologies: optical circuit switching [2] and optical packet switching 
[3]. It uses one-way signaling scheme with an out-of-band method, which mean
 10 
 
the burst header packet (BHP) is sent in a separate channel from the data burst 
(DB) channel. OBS is designed for a better utilization of wavelengths in order to 
minimize the latency (setup delay) and avoid the use of the optical buffers [4].  
OBS transmission technique keeps the data in the optical domain and 
allows for sophisticated electronic processing of control header information at 
another domain. As illustrated in Figure 2.1 (a), the transmission works by 
assembling the incoming data traffic from clients at the edge node (called ingress) 
of the OBS network into what is called data burst (DB). Then a BHP, which 
contains the information about the DB packets, including the burst length, arrival 
time, offset time, etc., is transmitted ahead over a devoted Wavelength Division 
Multiplexing (WDM) channel (out-of-band). The BHP precedes the DB by a time 
known as offset time in order to reserve the required resources and to set up the 
path configuration for the DBs in the core switches [5]. The BHP goes through 
Figure 2.1 (a) Assembling of packets at an ingress node; (b) BHP (O-E-O) 
conversion at a core switch to allocate the resources for the incoming data burst 
in OBS networks. 
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the Optical-Electronic-Optical (O-E-O) conversion at each intermediate node and 
is processed electronically to allocate the resources for the incoming data burst 
into the optical domain [6, 7] as shown in Figure 2.1 (b). OBS data bursts may 
have different lengths, and encompass many types of traffic (IP packets, ATM 
cells, optical packets, etc.). The ingress sends the data in the form of bursts which 
will be disassembled at the destination edge router (called egress).   
Even with all its merits, OBS networks like any other communication 
networks can suffer from several threats. Some of the known threats are orphan 
bursts, redirection of data bursts, replay, BHP flooding attack, fake burst header 
attack and denial of service attack [8].  
In this work, we are interested in the denial of service (DoS) that can be 
caused by BHP flooding attack, and aim to prevent a legitimate BHP from 
reserving the required network resources at the intermediate core switch. This 
type of attack relies on the flooding approach that has been studied in traditional 
DoS against the TCP protocol [9, 10]. For instance, the SYN flooding attack 
intends to exhaust the resources of the TCP/IP stack (e.g. the backlog) of the 
victim host by generating enormous numbers of SYN requests toward the victim 
host without completing connection setup.  The victim host will be unable to 
accept legitimate connection requests if its backlog is fully occupied by all the 
fake half-opened connections [11]. 
 12 
 
In a similar way, the BHP flooding attack can subjugate the core switches 
when a malicious node sends large numbers of BHPs into the network without 
transmitting the actual DBs. When a core switch reserves WDM channels for the 
incoming BHPs, it changes the status of the reserved channels from unoccupied 
to occupied. Figure 2.2 demonstrates that when the target node (a core switch) 
receives malicious BHPs, the target node starts reserving new WDM channel for 
each malicious BHP. This prevents a legitimate BHP from reserving the required 
network resources at the intermediate core switch [2]. When a legitimate DB 
arrives and there are no unoccupied WDM channels available, the arrived DB 
will be dropped by the core switch and the reserved channels will be waiting for 
unidentified bursts which may never arrive [12].  
Figure 2.2 BHP Flooding attack on core switches in an OBS networks. 
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This paper proposes a new security model, called the node classifier, which 
is designed to counter BHP flooding attacks. The proposed model has an 
adaptive sliding range window to classify ingress nodes into three classes. This 
classification will be based on the number of lost burst from each ingress node 
during time window to measure the performance of nodes and detect BHP 
flooding attack at preliminary classes. 
2.2 Design of the Proposed Security Model 
In this section, we present our proposed security model designed for BHP 
flooding countermeasure, and it is illustrated in Figure 2.3. In order to combat 
BHP flooding attacks, we study and analyze the behavior of each node to 
discover the point when the node is misbehaving. This can be considered an alert 
to prevent the malicious BHPs from reserving the network resources. The 
proposed security model has several merits summarized as follows: 
 It only requires software modification and implementation, and does not 
require additional hardware.  
 It is easy to be integrated with existing core switches architecture. 
 It is not necessary to modify all the core switches at once for the model to 
effectively work. Incremental deployment of the model can still enhance the 
security of the OBS network. 
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The model works by classifying all the ingress nodes into three possible 
classes, namely Trusted, Suspicious, and Blocked. Initially, the model classifies all 
the nodes into the Trusted class. As time goes on, the classifier changes the class 
assignment of each ingress node based on its observed performance such as 
packet arrival rate and packet dropping rate using a sliding range window. For 
example, if a node is acting normally by sending the BHP with its corresponding 
DB on the expected time (BHP arrival time + offset time), the node will be 
assigned to the Trusted class. However, when the ingress node at some point 
does not send a predefined number of corresponding DBs within the expected 
time, the classifier assigns Suspicious class to the node. In cases when the 
transmitted data do not arrive at all and the packet dropping rate keeps 
increasing, the ingress node will then be assigned to the Blocked class, hence 
subsequent BHPs from this node will no longer be accepted and none of the 
available resource will be reserved for this node. Lastly, in cases of any BHP 
Figure 2.3 The classification process of the proposed model. 
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flooding attack, the classifier will eventually add the compromised node to the 
blocked list. 
An ingress node can redeem itself from the Blocked and Suspicious classes 
back to Trusted by improving its throughput and lowering the packet dropping 
rate, i.e. stopping the BHP flooding attacks. In typical BHP attack, the attacking 
ingress node keeps sending the bogus BHPs. In this case, the core switches that 
place this attacking node in the Blocked class will not be able to forward its BHPs 
and will not allow the node to be allocated network resources. However, when 
the blocked node stops sending bogus BHPs and starts sending legitimate DBs, 
the arrived DBs will be used to redeem the node from the Blocked class.  
2.3 Implementation 
In this section, we discuss the implementation of our classification model 
in detail, and introduce its three main components (data structure, sliding range 
window, and classifier). 
2.3.1 Data Structure 
The model’s data structure is composed of two layers. The first layer 
allows a core switch to store and maintain information about each connected 
port (representing an ingress node) including the following fields: 
1) Port ID. 
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2) Class: The class currently assigned to this ingress node (i.e. Trusted, 
Suspicious, Blocked) 
3) Ingress node array size: The size of the array for each ingress node. The size 
will be incremented by each received BHP and decremented by each 
dropped BHP from the array. 
4) The number of dropped BHPs: This parameter keeps account of how many 
BHPs from each ingress node have been dropped based on the sliding 
range window. 
5) BHP Array: A pointer to the array of the BHPs. The array will be created 
dynamically for memory management purpose.  
The second layer of the model’s data structure is used to store information 
about the BHPs received from each incoming node (ingress node or core switch), 
including the following fields: 
1) BHP_ID: This item is used to check which BHP does and does not have 
corresponding data burst received.   
2) Offset Time: This is the time after which a BHP is considered  part of a 
flooding attack when no more data arrive  
 17 
 
The primary reason of using this data structure is to efficiently manage 
and store the data regarding each connected node. Figure 2.4 depicts a bird’s eye 
view of this data structure management process. 
 2.3.2 Sliding Range Window 
The proposed classification model utilizes a sliding range window scheme 
that is implemented as a circular queue. The window enables the classifier to 
monitor the behavior of each connected node over short and long periods to 
assign the appropriate and accurate class to each node.  
The size of the window and the number of slots within the window need 
to be considered and configured carefully. Since most network performance 
Figure 2.4 The proposed data structure component of the proposed security 
model. 
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metrics such as throughput or dropping rate are usually calculated in the unit of 
seconds, e.g. transmitted bytes per second, a natural choice of the window size is 
one second. However, a congestion or unexpected high dropping in data traffic 
may happen wherein the number of dropped DB may fluctuate in each slot. For 
example, consider the following worst case scenario in which only one BHP is 
transmitted in one second and the corresponding DB has not arrived, the result is 
100% dropped packet rate in this period. Our classifier will block the node since 
the expected DB did not arrive. For this reason, we have to monitor the behavior 
of the edge nodes over short and long periods of time by computing packet 
dropping rate in each time slot using a sliding range window.  
Moreover, the time range threshold cannot be set too long such that the 
attacker can flood the network within a short period of time and then 
discontinue doing so without being detected. Further, the time range cannot be 
set too short either, otherwise we cannot accurately determine the behavior of the 
node.  Hence, in the case of Trusted class, we divide the window (one second) 
into 10 slots (one tenth of a second for each slot) during experimentations, 
whereas in the cases of Suspicious and Blocked classes, we double the number of 
time slots to 20 to closely monitor the node behavior. 
Within the sliding range window, there are multiple counters for 
calculating the numbers of transmitted and dropped BHPs. We define WS and 
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WE as the start and end of the sliding range window, respectively. The sliding 
range window method often finds the total number of dropped and arrived DB 
packets per slot using transmitted BHPs per slot, and it calculates the dropped 
packets rate per slot or over the entire window. Our model considers each time 
slot and the entire window range W (one second) to monitor the behavior of the 
ingress nodes. Subsequently, each ingress node will be assigned a class based on 
its packet dropping rate.   
Figure 2.5(a) shows an example of counting the number of harmful BHPs 
that its corresponding DB have not been received for a short period (i.e. per slot), 
such as ((0 = slot 1), (6 = slot 2), (5 = slot 3)). Figure 2.5(b) also illustrates the 
number of harmful BHPs for a long period (i.e. per second), such as (S1 through 
S10).  
 
Figure 2.5 (a) Number of dropped DBs in each slot or cycle; (b) number of 
dropped DBs for one second; 0 indicates no DBs has been dropped. 
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2.3.3 Classifier 
The basic idea of the classification model is to detect harmful ingress node 
at preliminary classes. However, what is the appropriate criterion for judging 
whether a node is under a BHP flooding attack? Based on previous research 
studies, i.e. [32, 33], a consistent high utilization of the network resources 
normally greater than 40% is an indication of network’s performance 
deterioration. Moreover, link utilization ratio (the link’s bandwidth being 
currently utilized by the network traffic) is another indicator of possible threats 
to the node. The node utilization can be calculated according to [33] using 
equation (1) 
 Utilization % = (data bits x 100) / (bandwidth x interval)  (1) 
The above two observations are typically used as indicators when a node 
is under a possible threat. In our model, we use 40% BHPs that do not have 
corresponding DB packets received as a threshold for blocking attacks. This is 
since 40% of the resources are reserved by malicious BHPs and are unused. This 
is a condition where we can be confident that the network is under BHP flooding 
attack. Note that this condition is distinguishable from network congestion, since 
in a congested network not only DB packets will be dropped, but BHPs as well. 
When using the 40% utilization as the single boundary of judging whether BHP 
flooding attack this may risk ignoring normal packet dropping cases such as 
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network congestion. Therefore, we split the 40% threshold into two ranges, in 
which the first 20% is considered trustworthy, and the second 20% is considered 
suspicious but allowing the node a chance to redeem itself as trustworthy again 
once the abnormality disappears. We define the class assignment value of the 
node using the following rules: 
 Trusted if: 80%  ArrivedRate  100%. 
 Suspicious if: 60%  ArrivedRate < 80%. 
 Blocked if:             ArrivedRate < 60%. 
Algorithm: Assign Node Class 
Input: Edge Router Number 
Output : Node Class 
Preprocessing: Data Structure and Sliding Window are populated with 
edge router information 
 
STEP 1 
 
Check Class 
IF (Edge Router has NO Class) THEN RETURN 
TRUSTED 
 
STEP 2 Calculate from each slot in the sliding window 
Total number of dropped packets (DP) 
Total number of arrived packets (AP) 
 
STEP 3 Calculate percentage of packet drop rate 
PDR ← (DP / DP+AP) * 100 
 
STEP 4 Assign node class by checking 
IF            (PDR  20) THEN  Class ← TRUSTED 
ELSE IF (PDR  40) THEN  Class ← SUSPICIOUS 
ELSE                                       Class ← BLOCKED 
 
STEP 5 RETURN Class 
 Figure 2.6 the process of classifying nodes 
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Figure 2.6 shows the algorithm process of classifying nodes. The 
procedure uses the sliding range window explained earlier and the classifier to 
assign each node its appropriate value. 
2.4 Evaluation and Analysis 
In this section, we explain the simulation setup and experimental results 
of our model. The simulation is conducted on a modified version of NCTUns 
network simulator to evaluate the performance of the proposed classifier [32]. 
The topology used in the simulation is shown in Figure 2.7, which contains eight 
core switches (3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10) to simulate an OBS network, two ingress edge 
routers (2, 11), one egress edge router (12), one legitimate sender (1), one receiver 
(14) and one attacker (13). It is worth to note that the attacker node can be located 
in different places of the topology, but we choose to place it near the destination 
in order to emphasize its effect and because the probability of remaining 
undetected is high. Moreover, although our classifier can handle any number of 
Figure 2.7 OBS network topology used in evaluation. 
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ingress nodes and any number of attackers, in our experiments we use only one 
legitimate ingress node and one attacker. This is because we are interested in 
testing our classifier against the BHP flooding attack rather than testing the 
possible congestion in this topology.  
Table 2.1 shows the simulation parameters for the OBS network 
configuration. As for the traffic files, we created ten trace files with incremental 
traffic load rate (0.1 Gbps, 0.2 Gbps, 0.3 Gbps, …, 1 Gbps respectively, where 1 
Gbps is the maximum rate allowed by the simulator for each node) which 
represent the traffic transmitted by the legitimate sender. 
We conducted experiments based on a BHP flooding attacker of varied 
strengths to evaluate and compare our classifier with the default scheme which 
has no security measures. The objectives of these experiments are twofold:  
Table 2.1  
NCTUns Network Simulator parameter of the OBS Network configuration 
in evaluation 
Parameter Value 
Link bandwidth 1000Mb/s 
Propagation delay 1 μs 
Bit error rate 0 
Maximum burst length 15000 bytes 
Number of BHP channels  1 
Number of DB channels 1 
Use of Wavelength Conversion No 
Use of Fiber Delay Line (FDL) No 
Transport Layer Protocol UDP 
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1. Firstly, we want to observe the impact of BHP flooding attack on 
legitimate traffic when no security measure is employed; 
2. Secondly, we want to evaluate the effectiveness of our classifier in 
preventing the BHP flooding attack. 
We start with a lightweight attacker with 0.2 Gbps load. By attacker’s load 
we refer to the network resources collectively requested by the harmful BHPs 
sent by the attacker. Lightweight is relative to the traffic loads of other trace files 
used in our experiments. To increase the difficulty of detection, we make the 
attacker randomly flood the intermediate core switch with a random load of 
malicious BHPs with different interval time, and let the average attacker load 
reaches 0.2 Gbps. We test this lightweight attacker against all 10 trace files, with 
each trace file run three times and calculate the average. The results in terms of 
Figure 2.8 Comparison of percentage of lost packets number in the presence 
of 0.2 Gbps load of malicious BHPs. 
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packet dropping rate are shown in Figure 2.8. From this figure we can see that at 
the beginning when the legitimate traffic load is not very high, the packet 
dropping rate for the default scheme is not high. This is because the attacker load 
is relatively low which still leaves much bandwidth available for the legitimate 
traffic. The dropping rate of legitimate traffic starts at 26% and stabilizes to 
around 55% as the legitimate traffic load increases to 1 Gbps. This is expected 
since the legitimate traffic load becomes gradually higher than the attacker load 
and will request more bandwidth, which, however, has been falsely reserved by 
the attacker.  
The packet dropping rate of our classifier remains low, only around 1%. 
This is because our classifier detects the misbehaving node and assigns it to the 
Blocked class. Once the system blocks the attacking node, all the resources 
requested by the legitimate ingress node are granted and hence the packet 
dropping rate becomes low even for high traffic loads. The 1% of dropped 
packets is due to the period when the attacker was not yet classified into the 
Blocked class at the beginning of the simulation and was granted the resources 
requested by the bad BHPs, which leads to the slight dropping of legitimate 
packets at the initial phase. 
We continue testing with a medium-strength attacker with a load of 0.5 
Gbps, and a powerful attacker with a load of 1 Gbps, which is the maximum load 
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allowed by the simulator for each node. The results for these two cases are 
shown in Figures 2.9 and 2.10 respectively. For the default scheme, the packet 
dropping rate demonstrates similar trend as in Figure 2.8, except that the stable 
packet dropping rate is around 80% for the medium-strength attacker, and 
around 90% for the powerful attacker. These results are reasonable since higher 
attacker load gives the attacker a better chance to reserve the DB channel for 
longer time and may result in higher packet dropping rate for the legitimate 
traffic. By contrast, both Figures 2.9 and 2.10 show that for our classifier, the 
packet dropping rate remains as low as between 1% and 5%, which clearly 
demonstrates the effectiveness of our classifier in stopping the BHP flooding 
attack. 
Figure 2.9 Comparison of percentage of lost packets number in the presence of 
0.5 Gbps load of malicious BHPs. 
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Overall, the experimental results lead us to reach the following two 
conclusions. Firstly, if the BHP flooding attacker is more powerful to transmit its 
bad BHPs to request network resources at a higher rate, it can cause more 
legitimate DB packets to be dropped. Secondly, our classifier can effectively 
prevent the BHP flooding attack regardless of the strength of the attacker. 
Furthermore, the model relies on detecting/preventing the BHP flooding attack 
in time which makes our classifier model perform better. 
2.5 Related Studies 
In OBS network, there are several potential threats including traffic 
analysis, eavesdropping, spoofing, data burst redirection attack, burst 
duplication attack, replay attack, burstification attack, land attack and BHP 
flooding attack [8].  In this section, the focus will be on discussing security issues 
Figure 2.10 Comparison of percentage of lost packets number in the presence of 
1.0 Gbps load of malicious BHPs. 
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related to OBS network and present common threats particularly DoS flooding 
attacks based on the protocol level.  
In traffic analysis or eavesdropping attack, the attacker attempts to gain or 
access some unauthorized information about the target node by passively 
listening to the communication. The attacker in OBS can scan for an open 
vulnerability, and then intercepts active BHPs in order to compromise the 
corresponding data burst. When BHP gets compromised, the attacker will be able 
to analyze and monitor the transmitted information from the compromised BHPs 
which may expose him to the transparent DBs that contain the critical 
information. Passive attackers are hard to detect and can be seen a true troubling 
threat in OBS networks. In [13, 14, 15], the authors propose prevention 
techniques to overcome this type of attacks. 
In data burst redirection attack, the attacker injects a malicious BHP into 
the OBS network, causing the corresponding DB to be redirected to unauthorized 
destination. In OBS network, a DB is configured to follow the optical routing 
path set up by its associated BHP, but it is not able to authenticate the routing 
path of the BHP. If a malicious BHP is injected into the OBS network at a time 
such as offset time, any active DB can be misdirected to an unauthorized 
destination. The authors of [2], [12], [16] developed solutions to fight data burst 
redirection attacks. 
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In burstification attack, the attacker can compromise the ingress node by 
changing the DB size value that was originally recorded in the BHP. Then the 
actual DB could be mishandled as a different DB value according to the modified 
BHP, in which the receiving node will have to inquire for retransmission of the 
burst. This attack can happen at both edge (including ingress and egress) and 
core switches. The attacker will compromise the ingress node and modifies the 
burst size value to a larger size, such that the burst reservation time will increase, 
resulting in longer propagation delay and increased burst setup latency. In [17], 
the authors thoroughly discussed the burstification besides other threats that 
may occur on optical nodes. 
In land attack, the attacker compromises a node by making a copy of the 
BHP, modifying its destination address to the source address, and injecting the 
modified BHP into the OBS network. The result is that the corresponding data 
burst will reach the intended destination and the source itself. Due to this attack, 
some network resources will be wasted in sending the data burst back to the 
source, which in turn will cause some restriction on the sending resource in the 
best possible behavior. In [18], the authors discussed in details this type of attack.  
Research works more relevant to ours include [9, 10], [19], whose authors 
also addressed the problem of preventing BHP flooding attacks that may cause 
DoS. For instance, the authors of [9] proposed a new flow filtering architecture 
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that operates at the optical layer to filter out flooding attacks at early stages. The 
filtering process is performed based on comparing the offset time included in the 
BHP and the actual delay between this BHP and the associated DB. However, 
due to the high traffic rates in optical networks, the proposed flow filtering 
mechanisms cannot be effectively applied. 
In [10], the authors study the denial of service attack resulting from BHP 
flooding attack in the resources reservation protocols. The proposed 
countermeasure module uses the concept of optical codewords to optically filter 
the fake BHP and identify the compromised source node in the network. This 
module can work at the edge node but it cannot optically filter the fake BHP at 
the core switch. Moreover, the module does not perform any system validation 
at the core switch to evaluate the performance of each connected node in the 
network based on packet arrival rate/packet dropping rate and 
allowing/blocking security rules. 
In [19], the authors proposed a prevention mechanism to detect BHP 
flooding attack in TCP over OBS network. This mechanism is limited based on 
the statistical data collected from packets, and the threshold is not well defined 
to justify whether the behavior of the node is normal or under an attack. 
Moreover, the solution proposed by the authors increases the end-to-end delay 
which reduces the performance of the computer network with respect to its 
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associated Quality of service (QoS) variables. [19]’s prevention mechanism only 
reduces the trust value of the node until it reaches a value below the threshold. 
However, there is no real or immediate action to stop the attacks before they 
occur.   
It is worthy to note that flooding is a very common way to launch 
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, in which the distributed attacking 
sources simultaneously transmit an overwhelming amount of malicious 
unwanted traffic toward the victim machine to congest the victim’s network and 
drain the victim’s communication and computation resources. Many approaches 
have been proposed to address DDoS flooding attacks, such as rate-limiting 
schemes [20,21,22,23,24,25] and IP traceback schemes [26,27,28,29,30,31]. 
However, the main purposes of these schemes are to identify the attacking 
sources and restrain them from sending excessive traffic. By contrast, the 
problem with BHP flooding attacks is that the attacking sources, whose identities 
are already known to the core switches, do not send out the corresponding data 
burst traffic after sending BHPs to reserve network bandwidth. This major 
difference deems the rate-limiting and IP traceback schemes unfit for addressing 
BHP flooding attacks. 
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2.6 Summary 
In this work, we proposed a new security classification model for 
countering BHP flooding attack with an adaptive sliding range window to detect 
nodes based on their behavior. The classifier enables core switches to measure 
the performance of incoming nodes and detect BHP flooding attack. The 
simulation results show that our proposed classifier is effective in preventing 
BHP flooding attack. They show that the overall packet dropping rate when the 
classifier is used is less than 5% in all traffic load cases under BHP flooding 
attack. This is a remarkable improvement over the default scheme that employs 
no security measures, which results in up to 90% packet dropping rate. The 
proposed classifier has been studied with various scenarios with different cases 
to demonstrate its capability of securing the OBS network from BHP flooding 
attack, such as critical links in the network. We note during experimentations 
that our classifier not only can secure the core switches in the OBS network, but 
also has the potential to improve the QoS performance of the OBS network. In 
the near future, we will extend the solution to increase the performance of our 
current model and add QoS improvement features for OBS networks based on 
the node classification. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DECISION TREE RULE LEARNING APPROACH TO COUNTER BURST 
HEADER PACKET FLOODING ATTACK IN OPTICAL BURST SWITCHING 
NETWORKS 
3.1 Background 
An Optical Network (ON) is a common network for transmitting data 
from source to destination via an optical fibre medium using light [1]. Featuring 
efficient quality performance indicators such as bandwidth and speed in contrast 
to traditional networks, ON is the preferable option for Internet infrastructure 
[2].  In order to make use of the huge bandwidth of ON, Optical Burst Switching 
(OBS) was proposed in [3] as the next generation of optical switching technology. 
Once it has obtained the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) packets, OBS network 
will assemble the packets from the clients at the edge nodes (ingress node) into a 
data burst (DB) and a burst header packet (BHP) will be transmitted in advance 
in order to preserve the network resources required before the DB is actually 
sent. However, an attacker can exploit this fact and can make an ingress node 
(source node) overloads (flood) the network with BHPs that reserve the 
resources without transmitting the actual DB [4]. It is important therefore, to
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ensure that prevention of BHP flooding attacks is set as a high priority in OBS, as 
it could severely reduce the performance of the entire network and eventually 
cause a Denial of Service (DoS) [5].  Despite the many advantages of the OBS 
network such as resiliency, bandwidth efficiency as well as its economic benefits, 
QoS and security can become issues for these networks, with consequences 
including burst loss as a result of BHP flood attacks [35, 10]. Attacks of this type 
are reliant on the flooding approach which has been examined in traditional DoS 
against the TCP protocol [11]. 
A limited number of studies exist in relation to dealing with and 
preventing issues caused by BHP flood attacks within OBS networks (such as, in 
[9, 10, 35, 36]). For example, [9] proposed a flow filtering architecture operating 
at the optical layer to filter out BHP flood attacks at an early stage. The filtering 
process is performed through a comparison between the offset time included in 
the BHP and the actual delay between this BHP and the associated DB. In [10], 
the authors examined the issue of DoS within the resources’ reservation 
protocols. This countermeasure adopts the method of using optical code words 
which filter out fake BHP in order to identify the compromised source node 
within the network. In [35] meanwhile, the authors proposed a prevention 
method which was built by gathering statistical data from packets used to detect 
a BHP flood attack in TCP within an OBS network. In [36], the authors proposed 
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and developed a new security model which could be integrated within an OBS 
core switch architecture to prevent BHP flooding attacks. Using a 
countermeasure security model enables the core switch of the OBS to classify the 
ingress nodes according to their behaviour in addition to the amount of reserved 
resources not being used. A malicious node which causes a BHP flooding attack 
can be blocked using this model until the risk is disappeared. The issues with 
these methods however is that they do not use the machine learning (ML) 
techniques which are available to identify edge node behaviour in order to 
counter the risk of BHP flooding attacks. These methods also contain their own 
faults and can be limited in their execution and therefore need further 
authentication.  
This study will examine the problems of DoS resulting from BHP flooding 
attacks in which legitimate BHPs are prevented from preserving network 
resources for legitimate DBs. The ML architecture we have developed features 
sets of beneficial learnings gathered from past simulations carried out using a 
reduced number of features including the bandwidth used, the average packet 
drop rate as well as the average delay time per second and other factors (further 
details are presented in Section 3.3). One of the most encouraging data analysis 
methods used by researchers for prediction is ML [37]. It features intelligent 
techniques in order to complete a specific task which is usually linked to 
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knowledge building or isolating patterns which are concealed [38]. Little 
research exists around the classification of edge nodes in preventing BHP 
flooding attacks within OBS networks. A large proportion of this research related 
to classifying traffic of computer networks through the use of ML, for example 
[39, 35, 40, 41], are not solely focused on the classification of BHP flood attack 
within OBS networks. Through our study, we find that ML can have a vital 
function in preventing BHP flood attacks, resulting in improved QoS. These 
results from the prediction decision used in ML techniques rely on automated 
knowledge learnt, which can impact the predisposed decisions made by users, 
leading to improved predictive accuracy. 
Classification is one of the most frequent ML tasks which require the 
prediction of a target attribute [42]. Classification related to building a model (the 
classifier) using a recorded set of data along with a number of variables using 
data processing, and then using the classifier in order to predict precise attributes 
(the class) within the hidden dataset [43]. In relation to the issue of BHP flooding 
attacks, the edge nodes can be classified into pre-defined classes, e. g. Behaving 
or Misbehaving, meaning that this issue can be classified within predictive tasks, 
and of course, classification.  The key objective therefore will be to forecast the 
type of edge nodes involved in order to prevent the risks associated with 
occupying network resources with improper use.  
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Of the different classification approaches used within various domains, 
the rule extraction from decision tree models is one of the most effective [44]. 
Decision tree models are a type of classification method which is cleverly built 
using an information theory approach [45].  For example, [46] used Entropy and 
Information Gain methods to build decision trees within an algorithm labelled 
C4.5. Using the training dataset to form the tree, every individual path stemming 
from the root node to the leaf represents a corresponding If-Then rule.  
In this Chapter, we have investigated the potential of machine learning in 
countering the risk of BHP flood attack problem. In particular, we have proposed 
and developed a new series of rules using the decision tree method as a way to 
prevent the risks of the BHP flood attack problem. Firstly, the decision tree 
method proposed will build a binary classification model which can classify the 
edge nodes into two classes (Behaving and Misbehaving).  Hundreds of 
simulation runs were used in order to collect the data to build the binary models, 
gathering the various attributes associated with how the edge nodes perform. It 
worth to note that the use of only two types of classes (binary) is intended for the 
researchers and developers who are interested in security of OBS networks and 
want only to identify suspicion nodes (Misbehaving). Next, the classification 
models were improved through splitting the Misbehaving class into further sub-
class labels as we desired to establish a priority procedure for data transmission 
 38 
 
from the edge nodes (further details provided in Section 3.4). The proposed 
classification rule models were evaluated using different metrics to measure the 
overall performance of this approach. The experiments showed that using rules 
derived from the decision trees did indeed counter the BHP flooding attack 
problem and enabled the automatic classification of edge nodes at an early stage. 
3.2 BHP Flood Attack as Classification Problem 
In the field of artificial intelligence, ML is regarded as one of the most 
popular areas of research, and used for data analysis in various applications [42]. 
In recent years, researchers in the field of artificial intelligence and ML have 
developed several analytical methods which are directly concerned with the 
classification of datasets generated within various business areas. Some of the 
ML methods include Decision Trees [46], Greedy Induction [47], Associative 
Classification [43], Neural Network [47], Probabilistic [48], and Support Vector 
Machines [49]. Common ML methods tend to separate classification into three 
different sub-tasks, which are:  
 Learning: Learning involves the tasks of executing data processing on the 
dataset entered. One example is the associative classification method, in 
which class association rules, if they exist, are identified using an 
association rule algorithm. Meanwhile, decision trees will single out the 
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different input variable using Entropy (see Equation 4) in addition to a 
support vector machine method tries which will recognize a clear line 
within a hyper plane to identify the possible characteristics of the target 
class.  
 Model Building: This task is related to the building of a predictive model 
using the results of the previous task. The ML method will sometimes 
change the results of the learning task through retaining key elements to 
build the predictive model. For example, decision trees will prune 
pointless branches to cut down overfitting.  
 Class Forecasting: This task will use the ML method to measure the built 
model’s success rate in predicting the test data’s class values. The results 
of this step are used to serve as the model’s error rate or establish the 
negatives, model efficiency, classification accuracy and other factors.  
When a core switch within an OBS network reserves the wavelength 
division multiplexing (WDM) channels for the incoming BHPs, it will alter the 
status of these channels from unoccupied to occupied. If a core switch becomes 
the target of a BHP flooding attack and receives malicious BHPs, it will begin to 
reserve new WDM channels in correspondence with each received malicious 
BHP. This will prevent a legitimate BHP from reserving the essential network 
resources at this intermediate core switch [2]. If a legitimate DB becomes present 
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and no WDM channels are available, the core switch will drop the arrived DB, 
while the reserved channels will be waiting for unidentified bursts which may 
never arrive [50]. This research will focus on the BHP flooding attacks in terms of 
a classification issue as it is concerned with classifying edge nodes into a single 
type out of a limited number of possible class values such as Behaving or 
Misbehaving. Misbehaving nodes are defined as those send BHPs at a 
substantially higher rate without sending the corresponding DB.   
The definition of the classification problem is based on [51]. The training 
dataset is labelled as         , where     represents the combination of variables 
within the training dataset aside from the class variable, and    represents the 
class variable. A vector      
  can be assigned one of two disjoint point sets C1 
or C2 within an m-dimensional feature space.      
  is the ith training data row 
and             represents the ith class value. The aim is to derive a function, F, 
that maximizes the chance that          for each test data. Two-class problem 
(binary classification) is the simplest form of the classification; ci can be either -1 
(Misbehaving) or 1 (Behaving). This means Function      is: 
      
         
        
                             (1)   
In relation to an OBS network, BHP flooding attacks can be prevented if 
edge nodes are correctly classified into the appropriate types, with misbehaving 
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nodes being identified. More specifically, if the determination of the edge nodes 
that reserve network resources without proper use can occur in an early phase, 
then these nodes can be blocked. The blocking of the edge nodes means that the 
other ‘behaving’ edge nodes will be able to effectively reserve network resources, 
improving the resource management and QoS of the network. To deal with this 
issue, it is possible to build a model created from the edge nodes’ previous 
behavior displayed during the simulations. This enables the model to be used to 
automatically place the edge nodes into the right classifications in future 
simulations.    
3.3 The Proposed Rule-based Model for Anti-BHP-Flood Attack 
In this section, we will present the proposed classification architecture and 
its different phases. The various phases which must be included to promote 
classification rules necessary to counter BHP flooding attacks can be seen in 
Figure 3.1. In the initial phase, simulations were carried out to gather data 
relevant to the edge nodes performance indicators, which was then catalogued as 
the training dataset. Next, the training data set was pre-processed to remove 
noise or statistical biases. Once the data is cleaned, a filtering process takes place 
to detect the features which are the most influential, as well as reduce the 
dimensionality of the data. After selecting the features, the decision tree 
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algorithm will process the dataset to build a classification model that will then be 
transformed into rule sets. Any unnecessary rules are then be pruned to 
eliminate any redundant rules. The rule sets are finally applied to classify the 
edge nodes into a number of pre-defined classes against new test cases that had 
the same performance indicators. The following subsequent sections will explain 
the proposed classification architecture in further detail.  
 3.3.1 Understanding the Dataset  
When using ML to prevent BHP flood attacks, establishing the right 
training dataset from various nodes through the simulations remains a 
significant challenge. The domain expert will typically identify many variables 
that will directly and indirectly affect the OBS network which are also relevant to 
the sending performance of the nodes. The first challenge faced is creating the 
training dataset and determining the needed variables that ensure the ML 
Figure 3.1 The proposed rule based classification architecture for BHP flood 
Attack 
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method can be used in order to construct a predictive model. Identifying the 
necessary mechanism for converting the training dataset to the task of 
classification is another challenge. The initial challenge can be addressed by 
recording as many variables linked to the sending nodes as possible while the 
simulator is working. On the other hand, the second challenge can be addressed 
by establishing a new variable, the ‘class’ within the training dataset. Values of 
classes can be assigned using a knowledge base to the variable which is entered 
by domain experts, which will reduce biased data cases and make the building of 
the training dataset more legitimate. A comparison will be made between this 
class and the proposed ML’s predicted class to establish the effectiveness of the 
model in terms of accurate classification  
3.3.2 Training Dataset Preparation 
The right training dataset is very crucial step in order for ML algorithms 
to work as indented.  To prepare the training dataset for the purpose of 
identifying misbehaving nodes that are causing BHP flooding attack, numbers of 
simulations were carried out in order to collect the different variables related to 
the OBS network performance. Significant variables recorded include the 
sending node number, allocated bandwidth, bandwidth used, bandwidth lost, 
packet transmitted, packet dropping rate, packet received, transmitted byte, 
received byte, average delay time per second, and the percentage of BHP 
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flooding attack. For illustration purposes, Table 3.1 lists just four iterations for 
two of the edge nodes. 
Variables’ Descriptions 
 Itr: The iteration number. 
 Node: The edge node label. 
 FB: Initial Bandwidth assigned (given) to each node, the user (usr) in the 
experiments assign these values.  
 UB: This is what each node could reserve from the assigned Bandwidth 
from FB column. The drops here are due to congestions.  
 LB: The amount of lost Bandwidth by each node from the assigned 
Bandwidth at column FB.  
 PSBy: Packets size in Byte assigned specifically for each node to transmit. 
Note: 60 Byte will be added to the 1440 for the IP Header and the UDP 
Header ((Data size 1440 Byte) + (IP Header 40 Byte) + (UDP Header 20 
Byte)) =1500 Byte. 
 PT: Total transmitted packets (per second) for each node based on the 
assigned Bandwidth.  
 PR: Total received packets (per second) for each node based on the 
reserved Bandwidth. 
 PL: Total lost packets (per second) for each node, which based on the lost 
Bandwidth. 
 ByT: Total transmitted Byte (per second) for each node.  
 ByR: Total received Byte (per second) for each node based on the reserved 
Bandwidth. 
 ADTpS: Average Delay Time (per second) for each node. This is (End-to 
End Delay). 
Table 3.1 
Sample four iterations of two edge nodes   
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 PDR: Percentage of Packets Drop Rate for each node. 
 ByLR: Percentage of Lost Byte Rate for each node. 
 
Initially, the edge nodes were classified into only two classes, Behaving (B) 
and Misbehaving (M), as the issue was to identify the misbehaving nodes that 
reserve resources without the right usage and secure the network by the right 
action such as blocking it. We refer to this dataset as the ‘binary dataset’ since we 
have only the two classes B and M.  However, to improve the presentation of 
data further, and to better demonstrate the BHP flood attack scenario during the 
simulations, the binary dataset was augmented and a new dataset (multi-class 
dataset) was created.  The target classes of the multi-class dataset was linked 
with four possible sub-class labels, i.e. Behaving-No Block (No Block), 
Misbehaving-No Block (M-No Block), Misbehaving-Wait (M-Wait), and 
Misbehaving-Block (Block). These were assigned to a new column called “New 
Class: Action” based on the level of BHP flood attacks for 200 runs and using two 
edge nodes.  
In order to increase the statistical significance of the variables by 
smoothing their values and reducing the data variations or sudden drops in an 
iteration for each variable, the initial dataset (binary) and the augmented dataset 
(multi-class) were pre-processed. This was done by computing the average for 10 
consecutive iterations per variable, and for each node as one new data instance. 
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More specifically, for each node variable, the value of the data instance at its first 
iteration was the first 10 consecutive values’ averages in iteration 1 to 10, while at 
iteration 2, the second new instance value is iteration 2-11’s average values, etc. 
Finally, the dataset’s class values were assigned by a domain expert, i.e. (B and 
M) for the binary dataset and (No Block, M-No Block, M-Wait, and Block) for the 
multi-class dataset. The class assignments were based on a rule of thumb on two 
of the variables: the premeditated false resource utilization rate (percentage of 
BHP flooding attack) and the actual packet drop rate. (For more details about the 
simulation setup and the training dataset see section 3.4.1) 
 3.3.3 Feature Selection  
Choosing which features should be used to distinguish between behaving 
and misbehaving edge nodes is another challenge. However, this can be 
addressed through employing feature selection methods to filter the initial data. 
To determine the most relevant features in relation to the problem, a filtering 
method called Chi-square testing (CHI) was applied [52] with the Correlation 
Feature Set (CFS) [47] for verification.  
CHI is often used as a statistics metric and has been employed for use in 
both supervised and unsupervised learning applications to assess input data 
features’ validity. The CHI metric will test two chosen variables to measure their 
level of independence. In many cases, the target class of the input dataset will be 
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one of the variables, while the normal feature will be the other. In relation to the 
classification problem which is under discussion, the type of node (B, M) for the 
binary dataset and (Block, No Block, M-No Block, and M-Wait) for the multi-
class dataset, will be the class, while the feature could be anything from packet 
drop rate, bandwidth used, packet received, or other feature. Either way, the 
selected features will be unrelated to the other, although they will have 
significant links to the other classes being obtained. The CHI’s correlation score is 
given as: 
         
         
                       
.                            (2) 
  Where X is the frequency feature f and class c appearing together, Y is the 
frequency feature, f appears without class c, W is the frequency class c appears 
without feature f, Z is the frequency neither f or c appears, and N is the number 
of instances in the training dataset. 
The result of the CHI was verified using CFS which is known for being a 
more pessimistic form of filtering. CFS is used for verification because it has 
continuous input features (numbers and decimals), as opposed to the categorical 
features of CHI. Therefore, the input dataset needed to be discretized before CHI 
feature selection could be used. As CFS is able to work with both categorical and 
continuous features, it is important to use CFS to verify the dataset. 
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3.3.3.1 Feature Selection on Binary Dataset 
Table 3.2 shows the CHI scores from the processed binary dataset. It is 
important to note that four input features have been disregarded as part of the 
discretization process (where numeric variables are transformed into discrete 
variables) – the iteration number, node number, FB, and PSBy (abbreviation 
details can be found in Table 3.1). Once the CHI was applied, acceptable scores 
and high correlation against the class variables were noted in the features of 
“Lost Bandwidth” and “Packet Dropping Rate”. However, when applying CFS 
filtering method for verification before final results are recorded, three features 
seem to survive without the discretization process: “Used Bandwidth,” 
“Average_Delay_Time_Per_Sec,” and “Packet_Dropping_Rate”. Both filtering 
methods have highlighted “Packet_Dropping_Rate”, making the feature appear 
significant and so it has been retained. The “Average_Delay_Time_Per_Sec” and 
“Used Bandwidth” features have also been retained.  The “Lost Bandwidth” was 
discarded since it is the complement for “Used Bandwidth” and it would be 
Table 3.2 
CHI feature selection score generated from the binary training dataset   
CHI Score  Feature Name  
161.236  Lost_Bandwidth 
153.442  Packet_Dropping_Rate 
53.553  Packet_Received 
53.553  Used_Bandwidth 
53.553  Received_Byte 
51.818  Full_Bandwidth 
51.818  Packet_Transmitted 
51.818  Transmitted_Byte 
33.324  Average_Delay_Time_Per_Sec 
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ineffective if both were kept.  Finally, both the iteration number and the sending 
node were also noted.  
From the initial input dataset, three features (columns 3-5 in Table 3.3) 
have been chosen in addition to the iteration#, Node#, and the target class, as 
shown in Table 3.3. Two possible values exist for the target class: Behaving (B) or 
Misbehaving (M), which can be seen in the final column in the table. Table 3.3 
shows only a sample of four iterations for two of the edge nodes (9, 3) which are 
sending data. Each value in the selected features represents an average value 
computed from 10 sequential iterations. This is a vital step to ensure that the 
statistical power is retained and bias is minimized within the node performance 
results. 
 
 
 
Table 3.3 
Sample four iterations of the processed binary training dataset 
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3.3.3.2 Feature Selection on Multi-Class Dataset 
Table 3.4 below details the CHI scores for key variables for the multi-class 
dataset. The BHP flooding attack variable however has been ignored in the data 
processing phase since it has been used to construct the dataset, and thus there is 
concern about overfitting the model with biased results. An over-fitted model 
can generate great performance on the training dataset but a poor performance 
on any unseen datasets; therefore it has been ignored in the data processing 
phase. The CFS filtering method was used to verify the feature selection, 
meaning that the 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate remained the CHI and CFS’s most 
common variable. As a result, the selected variables were the 10-Run-AVG-Drop-
Rate and two variables selected through CHI filtering which were the 10-Run-
AVG-Bandwidth-Use and 10-Run-Delay. 
For illustration purposes, Table 3.5 shows how the edge nodes for every 
iteration was used to send data, and included the iterations which predominately 
featured misbehaving actions from both edge node. Iteration #5, for example, 
shows that node 3 has been assigned class = Block, as the BHP sent by this node 
did not contain data (high BHP flooding) meaning that a significant proportion 
Table 3.4 
CHI feature selection score generated from the multi-class dataset 
CHI Score Feature Name 
796 BHP Flood 
503.133 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate 
320.271 10-Run-AVG-Bandwidth-Use 
28.117 10-Run-Delay 
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of the BHPs had been reserved without use. However, although the same 
iteration showed misbehaving actions in node 9, the node was still permitted to 
transfer data (misbehaving but no block). Iteration #4 appears more complicated, 
as each of the nodes shows misbehaving actions, but not at the level of a 
significant BHP flood attack. As its dropping rate was smaller, node 9 was given 
higher priority over node 3. Nodes with low packet dropping rates (less than 0.39 
as a result of the rule already produced by the decision tree) would not be 
blocked and would be allowed to send data.  
After the datasets are created and pre-processed, the CHI filtering method 
was used to select the important features and verified using CFS filtering 
method, the next stage is to build the classification model. 
 
 
Table 3.5 
Sample of five iterations of the processed multi-class training dataset 
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3.3.4 Construction of Classification Models  
We propose an anti-BHP flooding attack classification algorithm based on 
decision trees. The proposed classification approach is shown in Figure 3.2. It 
separates data instances into subsets, which are further divided into smaller 
divisions until the subsets are homogenous or the termination condition has been 
met. If at the initial stage the data instances fit into one class (known as a pure 
dataset), a single rule will result to enable prediction of that class (lines 1-3). If, 
however, more than one label is associated with the training data, the 
Information Gain (IG) metric (Equation 3) will be used to determine the tree’s 
root node. This means the algorithm will iterate over the different attributes’ 
values in the training dataset to determine the attribute that has the largest 
information gain in splitting the training data per available class label (Lines 4-5). 
The information gain for each attribute is computed based on Entropy (Equation 
4). Once the largest gained attribute is identified then it be assigned as the root 
node (Lines 7-8), and the training cases are then clustered based on the splitting 
of this root variable. In other words, subsets of the training data are formed 
based on the root node’s possible values (line 9). Then, the same building tree 
function is invoked to on these subsets repeatedly, and the decision tree 
algorithm will keep dividing and clustering the data cases, while leaving 
heterogeneous data cases (conquer) out (lines 10-12). Each of the output tree’s 
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Input: Training dataset (T) and Tree { } 
Output: Classifier with rules CL 
Build_Tree (T) 
1) If T has one class 
2)    stop 
3) End if 
4) For each variable v    Do 
5)  calculate the information gain from splitting on v 
6) End for 
7) v_Max = The variable with the largest calculated 
information gain 
8) Tree = v_Max is added as a root node 
9) Tv = subsets of T that includes v_Max 
10) For each example in Tv Do 
11)    Treev= build_Tree (Tv) 
12)    Tree Treev 
13)    Pruning function  
14)    Predict test cases  
15) End for 
Figure 3.2. Build_Tree algorithm for constructing a classification model 
nodes represents the features needing classification, while the values of the 
features are represented by the branches. Once the initial tree is built and the 
algorithm terminates the training phase (lines 1-12) the algorithm invokes a 
pruning procedure that prunes unnecessary branches in the tree without 
hindering the overall tree forecasted accuracy. 
                                                        
 
                       (3) 
                                                                                                                (4) 
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where 
cP  = Probability that T belongs to class l, Tf = Subset of T for which feature 
F has value fa. , |Tf| = Number of examples in Tf, and |T| = Size of T. 
Once the tree reaches a point where it cannot grow further, the building 
process will stop. One potential condition for termination involves growing the 
node continuously until every data instance is connected to the same class, or that 
similar values are shared by the data instances. The algorithm deals with many 
issues.  The nominal and continual variables are handled by the classification 
algorithm, which means it is effective for noise tolerance. The algorithm also deals 
with the missing values and considers them important, and thus they can be 
estimated using probabilistic weights. For a specific variable (feature) with a 
missing value, each of its branches is given a weight based on its corresponding 
estimated probability after splitting that variable. For instance, if we have one 
variable “Gender” which has two possible classes in a problem (Yes, No) with 
missing values. If, through branching Gender, we have 100 instances - 70 
associated with Female and 30 associated with Male, the weights assigned to the 
classes for this variable are 70/100 and 30/100. Now, when we get a data example 
without gender (missing value), this can be estimated at being weighted 70% 
(female) and 30% (male). This enables us to allocate more than one class with this 
data example, i.e. Yes and NO with weights 0.7 and 0.3 respectively.  
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The classification algorithm deals with overfitting by preventing the tree 
from growing once it reaches a certain point; to prune redundant partial trees 
does not contribute to overall predictive performance. The algorithm employs 
sub-tree replacement by replacing these unnecessary nodes with leaves. A post-
pruning procedure involves testing pairs of nodes with the common parent to 
verify whether joining them together would possibly improve the Entropy by 
less than a predetermined value. If so, the leaves are merged into a single node 
with all possible outcomes. Equations 5 and 6 give more insight about sub-tree 
pruning.  
      
            
  
                                                                                             (5) 
where vN  is the number of training cases at node v and cvN ,  is the number of 
training cases belonging to the largest frequency class at node v. The error rate at 
sub-tree T is calculated as  
      
             
          
             
                                                                                            (6) 
After constructing the decision tree out of the training dataset, every path 
from the root node to the leaf of the tree will then be converted into If-Then 
classification rules. There are three reasons for this conversion: 
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1) The classification system will be easy to understand, making the rules 
manageable to allow network administrators to comprehend how BHP 
flooding attacks work, as well as the possible issues arising.  
2) Data priority and blocking policies will be developed as a result of 
determining the sending behaviour of the edge nodes during the primary 
stages.  
3) Overlapping and redundancy within the rules can be identified by the 
network administrator, allowing processes for rule pruning to be 
developed.  
For illustration purposes, the process of converting the tree into rules is 
explained in Figure 3.3, which represents a simple decision tree for the binary 
classification of nodes. In the figure, the nodes are represented as rectangles 
while leaves are shown as circles. The root node represents the feature that best 
divides the cases, i.e. “10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate”. Classification based on the best 
features continues until a parsimonious representation is obtained. In this 
example, once “10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate” was chosen, the first branch was based 
on values less than or equal to 0.38. This split leads to the second variable, “10-
Run-AVG-Bandwidth-Use”. The variable then splits on values larger than/equal 
to 0.80 and values less than 0.80. Each of these splits reaches a leaf node that 
denotes the possible class. In Figure 3.3, the tree consists of two variables, the 
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class (B, M), and three possible rules. Each of these rules denotes a path from the 
root node to the leaf node. Decision trees are useful given their representation for 
classification problems, which constitutes a large portion of everyday 
applications. 
The following reasons demonstrate why a decision tree was chosen as a 
way to create the models: 
1) Decision tree models have been previously used by many researchers to 
solve classification problems, i.e. [53, 54], etc. They offer high performance 
in terms of classification accuracy and in different application fields. 
2) Decision tree models are easy to understand since they can easily 
transform into a knowledge base that contains a set of If-Then rules. Recall 
then, that each path from the root to the leaf denotes a rule. The novice 
Figure 3.3 Decision tree model example. 
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user, or even domain experts, will be more interested in the rationale 
behind any predictive decision rather than just the predictive decision 
itself. Since the models contain rules that are easy to interpret and 
manage, these models can be extremely useful in decision making by end-
users when compared with models derived by other ML approaches such 
as support vector machines, probabilistic, or neural networks. 
3) The availability of decision tree models in ML tools such as R [55] and 
WEKA [56] means that researchers do not have to re-develop them, which 
saves a significant amount of time. 
3.3.5 Prediction of Test Cases  
Finally, the proposed classification model will use the established rule sets 
to predict the value of each class. We proposed a basic prediction method that 
takes into account the first rule that completely matches the test case variables’ 
values. Alternatively, the algorithm will search for the rule corresponding to all 
attribute values inside the test case, in order for the actual test case to be 
classified. To accomplish the task of prediction, our prediction method covers the 
discovered rules in a top-down fashion and assigns the class of the rule that 
matches the test case variables’ values. If there are no rules fully matching the 
test case, then the class label of the first partly matching rule will be assigned to 
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the test case. If no rules partly match the test case, then the majority class in the 
training dataset is given to the test case. 
3.4 Experimentation and Results Analysis 
3.4.1 Preliminaries  
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed decision tree 
technique on a dataset that consists of a number of simulation runs aiming to 
improve the performance of UDP over OBS networks. All of the variables related 
to the network’s performance were collected by running the NCTUns simulator 
for hundreds of runs on NSFNET topology [32]. One of the advantages of using 
NSFNET topology is that we will have the ability to add and simulate any 
number of nodes in the OBS network. The second advantage is that we will have 
the ability to record all the different cases that might take a place in the normal 
scenario where a single and multiple nodes are placed at different location. 
Furthermore, we will have the ability to position the attacker at any location, 
observe the behavior of the attacker and record its effect on other legitimate 
nodes based on its location. Using the NCTUns simulator with the necessary OBS 
modules [32], we collect the data used for classification which resemble the real 
world OBS network for training purpose. Therefore, for the normal scenario, the 
topology used to establish the training dataset in the simulation contains 
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fourteen core switches which linked to an ingress or egress (edge routers) and 
then linked to a legitimate senders or receivers (Host-PC). As mentioned earlier, 
the location of the ingress and egress edge routers are randomly chosen in order 
to examine the network’s performance of multiple nodes at different location in 
the OBS network. The following strategy has been developed to create the 
training dataset. 
1) Set the duration of the simulation to 10 minutes and the number of edge 
nodes to M. 
2) Record the different variables (see Table 3.1 for details).   
3) The edge nodes’ bandwidth capacity varied during the simulations in 
order to assess different situations. This is done to ensure all possible 
cases – normal, contention and congestion are covered.  
4) Repeat for N number of the simulations.  
Initially, we record the performance of each individual node with only 
one sender and one receiver. For each simulation run, the bandwidth of the node 
was assigned to 100 Mbps and then incrementally increases to 200 Mbps, 300 
Mbps, 400 Mbps, until we reach the maximum bandwidth of the simulator which 
is 1000 Mbps. This is in turn to record and observe how much traffic each node 
can transmit based on its distance from the receiver when assigned different 
bandwidth. Afterwards, we start by randomly adding more senders and 
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receivers, increasing the bandwidth of nodes at each simulation run (100 Mbps, 
200 Mbps, 300 Mbps ...1000 Mbps) and simultaneously making the nodes 
transmit as much packets as it can in one second. This is in order to observe all 
the variables related to the node’s performance i.e. (packets drop rate), the 
amount of traffic which has been transmitted by each node and also to 
distinguish between the normal, contention, and congestion scenarios during the 
simulation for each run. On the other hand, for the attacker scenario, we 
duplicate the same topology but this time by randomly placing the attacker at 
different location. This is for the aim to record the node’s performance and 
observe the affect of the attacker on the legitimate node when placed on different 
locations.  
During the simulations, the network load was adjusted in each simulation 
run, featured random (attacker node) and static (legitimate node) traffic for the 
number of nodes to assess the classifiers’ effectiveness. In addition, the attacker 
node can be located in different places of the topology; hence we randomly place 
it at different locations to seek its true performance on the OBS network. 
Moreover, although our topology can handle any number of ingress nodes and 
any number of attackers, in the experiments we used single, multiple legitimate 
ingress nodes and one attacker in each simulation run since we are interested in 
testing the classifiers against the BHP flooding attack rather than testing the 
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possible congestion in this topology. Every wavelength channel has 1 Gbps of 
bandwidth capacity (1 Gbps is the maximum rate allowed by the simulator for 
each node) which represent the traffic transmitted by the legitimate sender. Each 
WDM link has one control channel for BHPs and two data channels for DBs. The 
wavelength conversion capability was not assumed at the core switch.  
Table 2.1 shows the simulation parameters for the OBS network 
configuration. As for generating the traffic, the UDP traffic was transmitted using 
the greedy mode (which transmits the maximum number of packets) with an 
average packet size of 1500 bytes and duration of one second for each run. On 
the other hand, the attacker’s traffic have been generated using the simulator, but 
without pre-setting values. Situations for the edge nodes that (in simulation 
runs) would end up in random levels of BHP flood attacks were created. A point 
has been made to show scenarios in which there are occupied resources in the 
OBS network without utilization with different occupancies. The simulator may 
run for several minutes to achieve the result for “one second” depending on the 
load assigned.      
For the learning process, we used supervised learning approach. This is 
since we are aiming to build a predictive model to counter the BHP flooding 
attack problem using the data collected from previous performance results of the 
edge nodes during a number of simulation runs. Supervised learning involves 
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processing datasets to learn the classification models that are then utilized or 
used to automatically classify edge nodes during a future simulation run to the 
right class. The learning during the data processing phase is often guided toward 
a target variable called the class label and hence the model generated only 
predicts the target class variable. A common example of supervised learning is 
loan approval application in banking which aims to either approve or reject loans 
submitted by clients.  
Since we are seeking to identify the behaviour of UDP over OBS networks 
by predicting the behaving ingress nodes from the misbehaving ones, supervised 
learning approach was adopted to accomplish this task. In supervised learning, 
an input data with several input variables plus a target class label is needed.  The 
input data in our case consists of different performance indicators related to the 
UDP over OBS networks that have been formed and a target class label (as 
previously discussed in section 3.3.3). This data is basically called a training 
dataset and it is used as an input to the supervised learning algorithm to  
a) Discover useful correlations between the performance indicators and the 
class label 
b) Construct a classification model (classifier) that can be utilized to forecast 
the class label value in test cases 
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The supervised learning algorithm utilized to build the predictive model 
is based on useful If-Then knowledge base derived by a proposed decision tree 
algorithm (Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 gives further details). To test the proposed 
classification algorithm and its types of feature selection, the WEKA ML tool was 
used [56]. WEKA is an open source Java platform implemented at Waikato 
University of New Zealand. The platform features various techniques for data 
analysis and can be used to perform a number of tasks including visualization, 
predictive and descriptive tasks. Classification, rule association, clustering, time 
series, regression and feature selection are some of WEKA’s techniques. 
In order to calculate the measure of evaluation during the building of the 
predictive models, a ten-fold cross validation evaluation approach was adopted 
[37]. In ML testing, this is a popular method as it can help to reduce overfitting 
within the training dataset. Overfitting typically occurs when the learning 
method over-trains on the input dataset to maximize the predictive performance 
of the resulting models. This leads to the serious issue of displaying effective 
performance on the training data, but poor performance on any test data, and 
thus the models’ performance cannot be generalized, with the models being 
rejected. The ten-fold cross validation process works through splitting the 
training data set into ten partitions. The classification algorithm is trained on 
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10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate < 0.395560763 
|  10-Run-AVG-Bandwidth-Use < 0.8003310674999999: B 
|  10-Run-AVG-Bandwidth-Use >= 0.8003310674999999: M 
10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate >= 0.395560763 
|  10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate < 0.410186542 
|  |  10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate < 0.4060369875 
|  |  |  10-Run-Delay < 5.5215E-4 
|  |  |  |  10-Run-Delay < 5.237E-4: M 
|  |  |  |  10-Run-Delay >= 5.237E-4: B 
|  |  |  10-Run-Delay >= 5.5215E-4: M 
|  |  10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate >= 0.4060369875: B 
|  10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate >= 0.410186542: M 
 
Figure. 3.4. The initial binary classification model. 
 
nine partitions and then evaluated on the remaining partition. The procedure is 
repeated 10 times and accuracies derived at each run are averaged. 
All experiments have been conducted using a computing machine with a 
2.3 GHz processor. C4.5 decision tree algorithms have been used for data 
processing to derive the predictive models for the BHP flooding attacks [46]. 
Finally, as discussed previously, CHI and CFS WEKA filters were used for 
feature selection [52, 57]. 
3.4.2 Results on the Binary-Class Dataset 
After the training dataset has been processed and the features have been 
selected, the decision tree algorithm was applied to the binary-class dataset in 
order to generate a predictive model for classifying the edge nodes into the 
appropriate categories. Two categories, the Behaving node (B) and Misbehaving 
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node (M) were featured in the primary dataset. The primary predictive model 
(featuring three variables and the class) can be seen in Figure 3.4. 
The classification model’s effectiveness is typically measured using either 
the classification accuracy or the error rate, which can be seen in equations 7 and 
8. Using these metrics, the test data is allocated a predicted class by the model. 
When the test data class results are similar to a models’ predicted class, a correct 
classification is recorded. Otherwise, a misclassification is counted. For test data 
with N data instances, the classification accuracy denotes the proportion of the 
correctly classified data instances from N, whereas the error rate is the 
proportion of misclassified data instances from N.  A 93% accuracy of the binary 
decision tree model was recorded, meaning that centred on the nodes behaviour 
dataset, it could correctly assign almost 93% of the data instances into the correct 
categories, misclassifying 16 instances. The reason why many of the 
misclassifications occurred was due to a behaving/misbehaving overlap in the 
dropping packet average rate. More specifically, an average packet dropping rate 
of between 32% - 40% was observed in 75% of the misclassified instances. The 
rest of the misclassified instances resulted from exceptional cases, such as when 
there was a high dropping rate caused by congestion rather than BHP flood 
attacks. It can also be due to uncertain behaviours in sending packets from the 
edge nodes, including packet delays or bandwidth usage.  
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The binary classification model produced from the network dataset 
contains three features. These features helped in the generation of several 
automated rules that have been extracted from the tree model. After rule-
pruning, these rules are described as follows:  
1) IF 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate < 0.395560763 AND 10-Run-AVG-Bandwidth-
Use< 0.8003310674999999  
THEN Class = B (205 cases classified correctly and 6 cases incorrectly)  
2) IF 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate < 0.395560763 AND 10-Run-AVG-Bandwidth-
Use >0.8003310674999999 
THEN Class = M (2 cases classified correctly and 1 case incorrectly)  
3) IF 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate is between (0.395 & 0.41) AND 10-Run-Delay is 
between (5.5215E-4 and 5.237 E-4)  THEN Class = B  (2 cases classified 
correctly and 2 cases incorrectly)  
4) IF 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate is between (0.395 & 0.41) AND 10-Run-Delay > 
5.237 E-4) 
THEN Class = M (22 cases classified correctly and 3 cases incorrectly)  
5) IF 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate is between (0.4060 & 0.4101)  
THEN Class = M (4 cases classified correctly and 0 case incorrectly) 
6) IF 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate > 0.41  
THEN Class = M (147 cases classified correctly and 4 cases incorrectly)  
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The above shows that rules 5 and 6 can be combined into one rule 
showing that “IF 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate > 0.41 Then Class= M Otherwise Class= 
B.” However, the number of errors when merging this rule increases from four 
misclassified instances to 10.  To remove noisy feature-class correlations, pruning 
was used to improve the initial decision tree, which produced the following 
important rules:  
 IF 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate <= 0.395522 Then Class = B (214 cases classified 
correctly and 6 cases incorrectly) 
 IF 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate > 0.395522 Then Class = M (184 cases classified 
correctly and 10 cases incorrectly) 
Just 16 misclassifications occurred within the above rules, equating to a 
4.27% error rate using just one feature: 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate. While the 
classification accuracy has been improved using two basic rules from the 
decision tree algorithm, the first rule of the initial model has not led to a loss of 
knowledge. Using decision trees and other ML predictive models can help end-
users by providing edge nodes with a binary classification, uncovering 
otherwise-hidden knowledge. This gained knowledge can help automate the 
classification of edge nodes as well as assisting the Network Administrators and 
other domain experts to determine the performance of edge nodes themselves. 
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3.4.3 Results on the Multi-Class Dataset  
Next, a more comprehensive model that contained multiple categories is 
introduced to better reflect the reality of the BHP flood attacks. Following the 
processing of the training dataset and selection of the features, the decision tree 
algorithm was applied to the multi-class dataset in order to provide the 
predictive model for classifying the edge nodes into their correct categories. Four 
categories, the Misbehaving-Block (Block), Behaving-No Block (No Block), 
Misbehaving-No Block (M-No Block), and Misbehaving-Wait (M-Wait) were 
featured in the new dataset. 
The decision tree-rule method was applied for data processing in the new 
multi-class dataset, and seven rules emerged. These rules are displayed as 
follows: 
1. IF 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate <= 0.4 Then No Block  
(225 cases classified correctly and 0 cases incorrectly)  
2. IF 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate <= 0.509 AND 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate <= 
0.416 Then M-No Block  
(33 cases classified correctly and 3 cases incorrectly) 
3. IF 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate > 0.515 Then Block  
(58 cases classified correctly and 22 cases incorrectly) 
4. IF 10-Run-AVG-Bandwidth-Use <= 0.53 Then M-No Block  
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(47 cases classified correctly and 9 cases incorrectly) 
5. IF 10-Run-Delay > 0.0009 Then M-No Block  
(17 cases classified correctly and 2 cases incorrectly) 
6. IF 10-Run-Delay <= 0.0007 AND 10-Run-Delay <= 0.0006 AND 10-Run-
AVG-Bandwidth-Use > 0.545 Then M-No Block  
(8 cases classified correctly and 3 cases incorrectly) 
7. Otherwise M-Wait (10 cases classified correctly and  4 cases incorrectly) 
From the new multi-class model, the packet drop rate variable remains the 
most critical for preventing BHP flooding attacks, as it appears in the tree 
model’s first three rules. There is no error rate within the first rule while it also 
encompasses a spread of data instances (i.e. 225), signifying a strong rule when 
trying to identify behaving and misbehaving edge nodes, which can then be 
separated further to isolate the edge nodes which may be leading to BHP 
flooding attacks. Meanwhile, the next rule identified 33 instances correctly versus 
3 incorrect ones. Again, this is a significant rule which showed that data was still 
able to be transmitted, despite the misbehaving edge nodes and therefore was a 
reliable QoS indicator in terms of the average packet drop rate variable of the 
nodes. It is clear in the third rule that as the average packet drop rate goes above 
51.5% in misbehaving nodes, it shows signs of reserving unused resources as a 
result of the BHP flood attacks causing the large part of the packet dropping. 
 71 
 
1. IF 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate <= 0.4 Then No Block (225.0) 
2. IF 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate > 0.4 
AND  10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate <= 0.509 Then M-No Block (112.0/23.0) 
3. IF 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate > 0.4 
AND  10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate > 0.509: Block (61.0/24.0) 
 
Figure 3.5. The multi-class classification model with pruning  
 
This node therefore will be prevented from sending further data. The remaining 
rules generated in the model (rules 4-7) are useful since two additional variables 
have been used: average bandwidth used and delay per second. However, these 
rules are associated with larger error rates and cover a limited number of data 
instances. For example, the last two rules only cover 25 instances, 7 of which are 
misclassified. 
The main feature contributing to BHP flooding attacks remains the 10-
Run-AVG-Drop-Rate with 10-Run-AVG-Bandwidth-Use and 10-Run-Delay 
following next. The multi-class models had a fair predictive accuracy of 83.66%. 
Interestingly, the accuracy increases to nearly 87% if the pruning method is used.  
Moreover, the number of rules shrinks to just three rules in the set, which can be 
seen in Figure 3.5. Just one variable is used within the newly pruned model: 10-
Run-AVG-Drop-Rate. According to Figure 3.5, 225 instances are accurately 
covered by the first rule, making it appear as an effectively predictive rule. There 
were 23 misclassified instances in the second rule out of a total of 135, while the 
highest error rate versus lowest data coverage was found in the third rule. 
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To better visualize the performance of the algorithm, confusion matrix 
(Table 3.6), also known as error matrix, is used [58]. Figure 3.6 shows a decision 
tree model confusion matrix derived from the multi-class dataset. It examines 
both the predicted and accurate class values from the classification as shown in 
Table 3.6, where the different rows represent the actual class instances and the 
predicted classes are presented in the columns [58]. The performance of the 
classification model is usually measured using either the error rate (Equation 7) 
or the classification accuracy (Equations 8).  
                                                                                                                (7) 
                             
       
             
                                                          (8) 
Where TP (True Positive) represents data instances that were predicted 
“Yes” and their actual class is “Yes”, the FP (False Positive) represents the data 
instances that are incorrectly predicted “Yes” and their actual class is “No,” FN 
(False Negative) denotes data instances that incorrectly predicted as “No” but 
have actual class “Yes,” and TN (True Negative) denotes data instances that are 
correctly predicted “No” and their actual class is “No. 
Table 3.6 
Confusion matrix for classification task in ML 
 
Predicted Class 
 YES NO 
A
ct
u
al
  
C
la
ss
 YES True Positive  (TP) False Negative (FN) 
NO False Positive (FP) True Negative (TN) 
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 a      b    c     d  <-- classified as 
224  1     0     0 |  a = No Block 
 0     89   24   0 |  b = M-No Block 
 0     21   30   0 |  c = Block 
 0     9      0    0 |  d = M-Wait 
 
Figure 3.6. The confusion matrix of the decision tree model derived from 
the multi-class dataset 
 
Figure 3.6 shows that the behaving edge nodes have been identified by the 
decision tree method without any errors (224 instances have been correctly 
predicted “No Block,” and they are behaving edge nodes). The misbehaving 
edge nodes were the ones which posed a problem. More specifically, 24 of the 
113 actual misbehaving nodes (not at BHP flood attack levels) were blocked. 
Meanwhile, 21 of the 51 instances were identified as misbehaving, but were not 
blocked and instead were predicted as “M-No Block”. An explanation for the 
misclassifications could be due to the high packet drop rates, but not at a 
significant level for them to be blocked. This means that in some iterations, the 
edge nodes will have reserved network resources, leaving the other portion of 
resources unused as a result of the BHP flooding attack.  
Another notable result in the confusion matrix is that all of the data 
instances that should belong to class “M-Wait”, have been misclassified to class 
“M-No Block”. This is due to two reasons.  The first reason is that a node gets 
classified as M-Wait only if there is a competition on reserving the resources 
between two or more nodes that have high drop rates but not to the point of 
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blocking.  In such case, the node with higher drop rate has to wait since it has 
less priority due to its misbehaviour.  In the experiments, we minimized these 
scenarios having two data channels in the simulator setting since we are more 
interested in the other three sub-class labels; more specifically, the blocking. The 
second reason is the overlapping data between the two sub-class labels (M-No 
Block and M-Wait). While misbehaving behaviour is present within both sub-
class labels and very likely has a high drop rate, the rate is not high enough to 
ensure that the instances are blocked. In this instance therefore, the decision tree 
failed to identify 9 challenging data instances, and instead misclassified them 
into a class which had some similar data instances. To overcome this issue, more 
simulation runs can be performed to have larger data representations for sub-
class labels M-Wait in order to allow the learning algorithm to differentiate 
among the sub-class labels in the resulting tree models.  
It is clear from the confusion matrix that the misbehaving edge nodes are 
the most difficult cases to predict. As a matter of fact, the false positives and true 
negatives presented in the confusion matrix by the decision tree method proves 
that the models derived are not overfitted. This is because during the simulation 
run, random levels of reserving network resources by the sending nodes were 
ensured. By separating the misbehaving class into three possible sub-class labels, 
the reality of the BHP flooding attack issue is exposed, creating errors as well as 
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providing more specific classification for the edge nodes. Transmitting data 
through automatic classification is a key method for ensuring better quality of 
service (QoS) through reserving resources.  
3.5 Related Studies 
In recent years, researchers have been drawn to the significant issue of 
data flow management within computer networks. The problem rested in the 
inability of packet headers to hold enough information to enable automatic 
classification, leading to a low accuracy in labelling traffic flow. Previous studies 
[38, 39] have employed ML methods in order to classify packets and flow within 
the Internet. Meanwhile, few related studies have used ML techniques within 
OBS networks [40, 50]. 
In [40], the authors differentiated between contention and congestion 
problems in OBS networks by classifying data burst losses. The authors 
developed a measure called the ‘number of bursts between failures’ (NBBF), 
which is designed to accurately identify the types of losses. The method applied 
both expectation maximisation (EM) algorithm [59] and Hidden Markov Chain 
(HMC) [60] to a sample of data gathered from burst losses. More specifically, the 
NBBF at egress nodes between two lost bursts is recorded so that the losses can 
be categorized, followed by the use of a HMM classification algorithm in order to 
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identify the kind of loss. The studies carried out show that this hybrid ML 
approach can single out both congestion and contention losses. 
The authors of [50] employed a new form of routing mechanism for JET-
based OBS networks called ‘graphical probabilistic routing model’, which 
identifies less commonly-used links on a hop-by-hop basis through adopting a 
Bayesian network [61]. The algorithm uses neither FDL nor wavelength 
converters at the OBS’ core switch. The simulation results of the study show that 
the adaptive routing algorithm suggested is more effective at reducing the Burst 
Loss Ratio (BLR) in comparison to more fixed methods.  
The authors of [35] proposed one of the earliest uses of ML in order to 
classify Internet data traffic. They used a Naïve Bayes probabilistic method of 
classification [48]. The early training dataset was built using various traffic flow 
identifiers such as flow length, port ID, the time elapsed between two 
consecutive flows as well as other identifiers. Traffic flow was manually assigned 
by a domain expert while the dataset was prepared. Next, the training dataset 
underwent the Naïve Bayes algorithm in order to produce a system of 
classification which would be able to instinctively predict approaching traffic 
flows. Large volumes of data were tested and displayed a 65% accuracy rate 
using the Naïve Bayes method, rising to 95% after some adjustments to the 
dataset, such as the use of feature selection.  
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The authors of [39] examined the issue of data traffic in order to 
strengthen network resource management, doing so through permitting the 
network manager to recognize different data traffic types. More specifically, the 
authors aimed to determine a key issue in relation to network performance in 
terms of source, destination, traffic quantities and so on, with recommended 
actions that the network manager should take. The study involved the collection 
of data traffic features including byte counts, connection duration, packet size, 
interarrival statistics amongst as well as others. Next, they applied the EM 
clustering algorithm to the dataset in order to cluster the traffic flows into a set of 
groups. The results recorded demonstrated that six key clusters, based on single 
and bulk transactions, could distinguish between the traffic flows to allow more 
in depth flow examination. They did not provide information on the 
categorization of the data flows following the clustering process. 
In [41], the authors surveyed the various ML approaches which had been 
used between 2004 and 2007 to classify and manage IP traffic within different 
forms of computer networks. They based their research around the existing ML 
classification methodology, feature selection, model evaluation and type 
learning. Both supervised and unsupervised learning approaches were examined 
using them to complete traffic flow classification across various typical computer 
networks. They examined unsupervised learning using clustering as well as 
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other tested approaches including EM and K-Means. Methods discussed for 
supervised learning included probabilistic (Naïve Bayes), K-Nearest Neighbour 
(KNN) [62], and Genetic Algorithm (GA) [63]. Finally, they examined the various 
evaluation approaches employed in order to judge whether or not the ML 
approaches were effective. 
The ML-based academic studies discussed above have centred on data 
traffic identification, whereas this study is concerned with a completely different 
issue – BHP flooding attack. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first 
to offer proposals and to develop a decision tree method of classification to 
provide a solution to the issue of BHP flooding attack in OBS networks. Since 
previous studies have not used ML as a way to block misbehaving edge nodes 
which send DBs in OBS networks, we believe a solution is needed in order to 
address this critical issue in the initial phases of BHP flooding attacks. 
3.6 Summary  
Although serving as one of the most promising optical switching 
technology for optical networks, OBS network is a technology that has not 
matured enough for it to be implemented and deployed. The basic idea of OBS 
relies mainly on the concept of sending BHP in advance to reserve the resources 
as well as setting the path for the packets that are aggregated into data bursts at 
the edge nodes.  Compromising an edge node by an attacker and sending BHPs 
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in large volumes without sending corresponding data bursts can lead to a serious 
security issue called BHP flooding attack. Network performance as well as QoS 
can be severely affected by BHP flooding attacks, which is why it is important to 
develop new classification strategies for identifying edge nodes with 
misbehaving sending behaviours at the initial stages.  
This research proposes to use ML to develop a new architecture based on 
decision tree that will accurately and effectively classify edge nodes of OBS 
networks using straightforward If-Then rules. These rules are discovered from 
real data related to multiple performance indicators (variables) recorded by a 
simulator. Initially, the proposed rules are able to classify the sending nodes into 
Behaving and Misbehaving with 93% accuracy. The models that are more 
realistic are then produced after dividing the Misbehaving class into four sub-
class labels in order to further classify this type of node based on data priority. 
Experimentations using multiple edge nodes on a large dataset collected from a 
number of simulation runs revealed that the rules generated by the classification 
algorithm are highly effective in preventing misbehaving nodes from sending 
data, and therefore able to counter the BHP flooding attack problem. More 
specifically, the tree models generated from the binary dataset were able to 
classify edge nodes with 93% accuracy. In addition, the modified decision tree 
models for the misbehaving nodes (multi-class dataset), had an 87% accuracy 
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when splitting the Misbehaving class into four sub-class labels: Misbehaving-
Block (Block), Behaving-No Block (No Block), Misbehaving-No Block (M-No 
Block), and Misbehaving-Wait (M-Wait). This breakdown meant that we could 
develop a fine-grained strategy for data priority for the edge nodes using the 
information gathered from the classification models. In the near future, we 
intend do an experimental study to evaluate several ML algorithms in order to 
seek the one which has the best performance for the BHP flooding attack 
problem. Also, we hope to further improve the classification architecture through 
being able to add further volumes of nodes, while also building the new learning 
algorithm into the simulator. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DETECTING BHP-FLOODING ATTACK IN OBS NETWORK: A MACHINE 
LEARNING PROSPECTIVE 
4.1 Background 
An optical network (ON) is a known medium for data transmission, 
adopting an Optical Burst Switching (OBS) network for the Internet [64]. In an 
OBS network, burst header packets (BHPs) are transmitted in advance to allocate 
enough resources prior to sending the actual data bursts (DBs), ensuring network 
management and Quality of Service (QoS). This enables attackers to flood the 
network with malicious BHPs, reserving the network resources without proper 
use. In this case, malicious BHPs continue to reserve the network resources 
without sending the actual DBs, hindering the performance of the OBS network, 
in some cases causing Denial of Service (DoS) [65]. Therefore, it is essential to 
prevent BHP flooding attacks in OBS networks by blocking misbehaving ingress 
nodes that continuously transmit malicious BHPs, and preventing the legitimate 
BHPs from reserving the required resources at the intermediate core switch.
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Limited research works detecting BHP flooding attacks in OBS networks 
exist, e.g. [9, 10, 65]. In [9], a data ‎flow classification architecture was 
implemented at the optical layer to combat BHP ‎flooding attacks. This method 
distinguishes between the offset time inside the BHP and ‎the recorded delay 
between this BHP and its related DB. [10] utilized optical code ‎words to single 
out malicious BHPs sent by ingress nodes in an OBS network. The ‎authors used 
statistical data analysis related to packets sent and dropped to detect 
the ‎possibility of BHP flooding attacks. [65] developed a new security model to 
be ‎implemented into the OBS core switch to prevent BHP flooding attacks. 
The ‎countermeasure security model can detect malicious ingress nodes based on 
their ‎behavior, alongside the amount of reserved resources that are not being 
utilized, and ‎block any malicious ingress nodes until the threat ceases. The 
reported results using ‎the NCTUns network simulator showed that the security 
method of [65] was able to ‎effectively differentiate among legitimate and 
malicious ingress nodes, thus ‎maintaining good network performance.‎ 
Despite the few recent studies on BHP flooding attacks, the detection rate 
is still low. Further, the entire process relies on the domain experts’ knowledge 
and experience. Therefore, there is a need for a more efficient detection system 
that can engage the core switch in OBS network, thus identifying misbehaving 
ingress nodes in an automated manner as early as possible. One promising 
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approach to accomplish this is the Machine Learning (ML) method. This uses the 
historical performance of source nodes during data transmission to construct 
classification models known as classifiers. The classifiers then predict whether 
the source nodes are sending legitimate BHPs or not, and filter out malicious 
BHPs that might cause flooding attacks. The outcomes of the ML method will 
enable security administrators to quickly block misbehaving ingress nodes until 
they change their behaviors. (It is the firm belief of the authors) that classifying 
ingress nodes using ML to counter BHP flooding attacks is yet to be studied 
within an OBS network.  
This study examines the performance of ML methods to counter the risks 
associated with BHP flood attacks in OBS networks. The problem studied is a 
typical predictive task in classification, in which different variables linked with 
ingress nodes’ performances are collected whilst sending BHPs (in simulation 
runs), and are saved in a training dataset. Examples of variables are not limited 
to iteration number, but can include the sending node label, packets sent, packets 
dropped, delay time, and so on. More details on the complete dataset of variables 
can be found at [66], and are briefly explained in Section 4.3. The ML role 
involves processing the different variables in the dataset to obtain concealed 
information useful for prediction (classifier). This classifier is then used to 
categorize ingress nodes in certain future scenarios as accurately as possible, 
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improving the manual classification which indeed requires care, time and 
experience.  
The ultimate aim of this study is to examine the applicability of ML to the 
problem of BHP flooding attacks in OBS networks. To achieve this, we 
extensively investigated various ML techniques that adopt different learning 
approaches to the research problem considered. We seek to identify the most 
relevant ML technique(s) for solving the issue of BHP flooding attacks, in 
addition to revealing the reasons behind the relevancy. Thus, we endeavor to 
answer the following research questions:  
 Can ML be used as a BHP detection approach in an OBS network? 
 Which ML techniques improve detection rate and time performance?  
 Which ML technique is more suitable to end-users, and why? 
The ML approaches considered in this study are Logistic Regression, 
Naïve Bayes, RIDOR, SVM-SMO, NN-MultilayerPerceptron, C4.5, AdaBoost, 
and Bagging [45, 48, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72]. The diversity of the ML approaches 
strengthens the confidence in the results, hence our recommendations (see 
Sections 4.3, 4.4 & 4.6). The performance of the wide range of ML techniques has 
been measured using different metrics, against a published dataset at UCI 
(University of California-Irvine) repository [73]. Specifically, we utilized 
classification accuracy, classifiers’ construction time in milliseconds (ms), 
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precision, recall, and the harmonic mean among other measures (Section 4.3 & 
4.4 give further details) [74].  
4.2 The Considered Machine Learning Techniques 
Since the BHP flooding attack is a typical prediction problem, 
classification methods in ML seems appropriate to identify malicious and 
legitimate edge nodes. In classification problems, a model called the classifier is 
constructed from historical labelled dataset(s). The learned classifier is then 
employed to forecast the class label in datasets that are unlabeled, known as test 
datasets [43, 75]. The quality of the classifiers extracted by ML methods rely 
primarily on the classification accuracy, as well as other known evaluation 
metrics such as recall, precision, and harmonic mean [38]. In addition, classifiers 
formed after data processing differ based on the ML techniques used. For 
instance, rule induction classifiers contain rules, and Naïve Bayes classifiers hold 
just class memberships in a probability format [76]. In this section, we highlight 
eight different ML techniques that generate different type of classifiers. 
Specifically, we investigate classifiers extracted by Logistic Regression, 
Probabilistic-Naïve Bayes, Rule Induction- RIDOR, Support Vector Machine -
Sequential Minimal Optimization (SVM-SMO), Neural Network-NN-
MultilayerPerceptron, Decision Tree-C4.5, Boosting-AdaBoost, and Bagging [45, 
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48, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72]. The choices of these techniques are mainly based on the 
following facts: 
1) Different learning methodologies are employed for data processing  
2) Different classifier formats are presented to the end-user 
3) Applicability and usage in previous domains in particular computer 
networks, computer security among others, i.e. [43, 75, 77, 47, 78, 79]. 
Steps of machine learning are shown in Figure 4.1, and are briefly explained 
below. 
1) Data pre-processing (Optional): In this step, any noise related to the training 
dataset, such as missing values, duplications, and feature selection are 
completed. The output of this step is a processed dataset.  
2) Training: In this step, the ML technique processes the data for knowledge or 
patterns. In classification techniques, the classifier is constructed in this 
step.  
3) Evaluation: The classifier is evaluated on a test dataset to measure its 
effectiveness. This step results in different evaluation metrics. 
4) Pattern Visualization (Optional): In this step, the outcomes as well as its 
quality measures are presented to the end-user in a non-technical manner 
to ease decision making.  
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The next section briefly summarizes known ML learning approaches that 
this study investigates to be utilized in solving the BHP flood attacks problem. 
4.2.1 Rule Induction - RIDOR 
Rule induction is a classification approach that normally extracts If-Then 
rules in a sequential fashion [76]. Typically, a rule induction technique divides 
the input dataset into splits according to the available class values. Then, for each 
class split, the induction technique learns and derives If-Then rules based on 
mathematical metrics, such as a rule’s expected accuracy (Equation (9)). Data 
examples in a split, for instance A, are positive examples for the class of A, and 
are considered negative examples for the other class labels in the other data 
splits. For a data split, the induction technique builds an empty rule, and then 
adds items to the rule’s antecedent (left hand side/body) until the rule meets a 
termination condition. When this occurs, the rule is generated, and all data 
examples that the rule classifies are discarded. Then, the induction technique 
Figure 4.1. Steps of ML classification technique 
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learns the next rule from the same split until the data split becomes empty. 
Following this, the induction technique moves to the next data split until all data 
splits become empty, or no more rules with acceptable accuracies can be 
discovered [78]. Common rule induction techniques are RIDOR [67] and RIPPER 
[80].  
RIDOR, for example, derives a default rule class, and then learns all the 
exceptions for that default rule using Incremental Reduced Error Pruning (IREP) 
[81], a learning method. An exception is a rule able to forecast the class label 
other than the default class. IREP eliminated one exhausting phase of an earlier 
rule induction technique called Reduced Error Pruning (REP), saving substantial 
training time. In RIDOR, the training dataset is divided into pruning (1/3) and 
growing (2/3) subsets. Then, RIDOR builds incremental rules one at a time. When 
a rule is about to be evaluated for possible pruning, its training data examples in 
the pruning and growing subsets are removed, and the rule gets extracted. 
During pruning, RIDOR considers deleting items from the rule’s body and 
terminates the pruning phase when removing an item from a rule cannot 
improve the rule’s accuracy.  
                                                      (9) 
where P = the # of positive instances covered by a rule r (both antecedent and 
consequent) 
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T= the total # of instances covered by r’s antecedent  
4.2.2 Decision Tree Rules – C4.5 
C4.5 [70] is a decision technique utilizing Entropy and Information Gain 
(IG) (Equations 10-11 below) to construct tree based classifiers for prediction. To 
build a classifier, initially, the IGs for all variables in the training dataset, other 
than the class variable, are computed, and a root with the highest IG is selected. 
The IG is calculated based on how informative a data variable is in dividing the 
examples in the training dataset with respect to the class label. When a root is 
chosen, the algorithm excludes it in the next iteration and repeatedly calculates 
the IGs for the other available variables, until the tree cannot be built any further 
or the remaining data examples are linked with just a single class. In the formed 
decision tree, a path from the root node to any leaf denotes a rule, and the leaf 
denotes a decision (class label).  
                                                        
 
                     (10)  
                                                                                                              (11) 
 where 
cP  = Probability that T belongs to class l, Tf = Subset of T for which feature 
F has value fa. , |Tf| = Number of examples in Tf, and |T| = Size of T.  
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4.2.3 Probabilistic Methods- Naive Bayes  
In classification, when a test example requires a class label, an efficient 
way to classify the test example is to use NB technique, which is based on Bayes 
theorem. NB calculates the probability of the test example with respect to each 
class label using prior knowledge of the test example’s variables, and their 
appearances with each class in the training dataset. The frequency of each 
variable and the class in the training dataset is obtained in addition to the 
frequency of each class label. Then, all probabilities are multiplied by each other 
and the test data example is given the class with the highest probability score 
(Equation 12 below). NB predicates independent assumptions for variables and 
the class, which is not necessarily true in real application data [82]. Nevertheless, 
this probabilistic technique is highly efficient in deriving classifiers in contrast to 
other ML techniques [83].  
Given a test data example as a vector A = (a1, a2, …, am) where each a is a 
variable, using NB, the conditional probability can be obtained as: 
         
            
    
              (12) 
The test data example will be given the class with the greatest 
probability        . 
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4.2.4 Boosting and Bagging 
Bagging and Boosting learning approaches use the training dataset in 
multiple trails to produce numbers of weak classifiers, that are then merged to 
form a global classifier [84]. The idea is to utilize both the weak and the strong 
classifiers in predicting the class label of test data.  
In Boosting, a weak classifier is simply built from the input dataset, and 
then utilized to assign class labels to the training data examples. The next weak 
classifier is built from the training data, and training examples that have not been 
correctly classified by the previous weak classifier are selected more often to be 
re-classified by the current weak classifier, improving the model’s predictive 
accuracy. The below steps clarify how Boosting algorithms, such as AdaBoost 
[71, 85], work:  
1) Select a base ML algorithm for learning such as a rule based classifier  
2) The base algorithm learns a weak classifier from the training dataset and 
assigns an equal weight for each training data example 
3) When there are misclassification cases (incorrectly classified data 
examples), we re-apply the base ML algorithm, and pay more attention to 
the unclassified data examples to improve the predictive performance  
4) Repeat steps 2-3 until the intended accuracy has been derived  
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5) Merge the weak classifiers to produce a strong classifier 
6) When a test data needs to be classified, use a voting mechanism to assign 
the class label from the strong classifier and the weak classifiers.  
In the Bagging classification approach [72], sample data examples are 
generated for each trail (iteration) from the original training dataset (often with 
the same size of the original training dataset). Then, a base ML algorithm is used 
to generate a classifier from the sample, and the process is repeated a number of 
times. Finally, all derived classifiers are aggregated together to form a global 
(strong) classifier. When test data is about to be classified in the Bagging 
approach, the class is assigned based on a voting mechanism using both the 
global and weak classifiers, similar to the Boosting approach. The difference 
between Bagging and Boosting approaches is that in Bagging, when the data 
sample is produced from the training dataset, the resembling process is not 
reliant on the performance of any previously derived classifiers, as it is in 
Boosting. 
4.2.5 ANN 
An Artificial Neural Network (ANN) consists of interconnected neurons 
that transform a set of input examples into desired output (class) without having 
to reveal the transformation details [47]. The ANN advantage comes from 
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choosing the right numbers of the hidden neurons, and the results often rely on 
the input variables features and weights associated with their interconnections. 
Nevertheless, determining the numbers of hidden neurons and other important 
thresholds prior to data processing is fundamental to the quality of the outcome 
in ANN algorithms. Questions such as, what is the right number of hidden 
layers, epoch size, and acceptable learning rate, among others, need to be set by a 
domain expert in order to generate fair and acceptable classifiers. Overall, 
researchers still utilize train-and-error methods to tune the aforementioned 
parameters since there is no clear methodology for setting these up [86]. ANNs 
utilize sigmoid functions during constructing classifiers, in which weights are 
repeatedly amended to come up with the desired error rate that the domain 
expert had set prior to the beginning of the learning phase. 
4.2.6 SVM 
SVM is a classification approach proposed to enhance the predictive 
performance of classic classification techniques [87]. This approach depends on 
hyperplanes, which divide data examples based on class memberships. The SVM 
learning mechanism sorts data examples using mathematical functions known as 
kernels. A kernel computes the similarity of data examples using the available 
classes in the training dataset [88]. Often, kernels are determined by SVM 
experts, and then utilized for the classification phase.  
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SMO trains SVM on a large quadratic programming (QP) optimization 
problem [68]. SMO decomposes the QP problem into a number of smaller 
problems, and then solves them by avoiding a numerical QP inner loop. The 
computing resource needed in the particular memory for SMO is linear in the 
training dataset size, which permits the SMO algorithm to process larger input 
datasets. Reported experimental results revealed that SVM algorithms such as 
SMO generate high predictive classification systems in multiple domains, 
especially text categorization rather than probabilistic, and induction [87, 89]. 
4.2.7 Logistic Regression  
When the target variable in classification dataset is continuous, (numeric) 
classic ML methods such as rule induction, decision trees, and covering are not 
able to produce a classifier. Linear regression can solve such a problem by 
offering methods describing the training dataset in the context of a predictive 
task, by revealing the relationships between independent variables and the class 
variable (dependent). Unlike linear regression, in Logistic regression, the class 
variable is not continuous, but is rather categorical (predefined possible values) 
[45, 90].  
Logistic regression is formulated based on Equation 5 below:  
  
     
       
                (13) 
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where p = probability of Y = 1  
 e = base of the natural logarithm (around 2.718) 
 a and b = inputs parameters of the logistic model 
Due to the curvilinear correlation between p and X, b in (Equation 13) is 
different than b in a typical linear regression model. We can linearize the logistic 
regression model by converting the dependent variable from a likelihood 
(probability) to a logit, as shown in Equation 14. 
    
 
   
                    (14) 
   
 
   
  = logit (log odds) of Y = 1                 (15) 
where 
a and b = inputs of the logistic model 
The logit (Equation 15) is often named a link function, because it gives a 
linear conversion of the logistic regression model.   
4.3 Experimental Setting and Data 
This section investigates the ML algorithm’s performance on a simulated 
dataset generated by the NCTUns simulator for over a thousand runs on 
NSFNET topology [32]. The aim is to enhance the performance of UDP on OBS 
networks by automatically detecting misbehaving ingress nodes that may cause 
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BHP flood attacks, helping to manage the network’s resources. By employing 
NSFNET topology, we can insert and simulate with any number of nodes, in 
order to investigate different scenarios. The simulation parameters for the OBS 
network configuration are displayed in Table 2.1. The simulator may need to run 
for 15 to 45 minutes to obtain the result for just “one second” depending on the 
load assigned.  
All experiments have been conducted utilizing a recently developed 
simulated dataset that belongs to the authors. This can be obtained from the UCI 
Machine Learning Repository (University of California-Irvine) dataset [73]. This 
contains twenty-two variables related to flooding attacks, including the class 
variable. The variables collected during the NCTUns simulator directly associate 
with the OBS network’s performance. The dataset size consists of 1075 examples, 
and each example denotes one iteration (a simulation run) in which an ingress 
node is sending data over the OBS network. Different scenarios, including BHP 
flood attacks without pre-setting values, have been generated during the 
simulation, ensuring that ingress nodes have random levels of BHP flood attacks. 
This is essential to show situations of occupied network resources without 
proper utilization and with different occupancies. During the simulated runs, 
two ingress nodes were used. In addition, for each simulation run, the 
bandwidth of the node was initially assigned to 100 Mbps, and then 
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incrementally increased to 200 Mbps, 300 Mbps, 400 Mbps, and so forth, until the 
maximum bandwidth, i.e. 1000 Mbps, is reached.   
For illustration purposes, Table 4.1 depicts eight variables with five 
iterations exhibiting how the ingress nodes for every simulation run were used 
to transmit data. The table displays iterations that demonstrated behaving and 
misbehaving edge nodes. The dataset contains four possible class labels (Block, 
No Block, Misbehaving-No-Block, Misbehaving-Wait), and thus the problem is a 
multi-class classification. In Table 4.1, at iteration #1, ingress node 3 was 
permitted to send data, since it was classified as a behaving node. Ingress node 9, 
associated with a low BHP flooding rate, was slightly misbehaving, yet because 
of its low packet dropping rate, it was not blocked. However, at iteration #5, 
ingress node 3 was blocked, since this node was causing high BHP flooding, its 
BHPs reserving bandwidth without utilization. At the same iteration, despite 
Table 4.1 
Sample of five iterations of the processed multi-class training dataset 
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node 9 misbehaving, it was still permitted to send data (misbehaving but no 
block). A trickier scenario is illustrated at iteration #4, in which both ingress 
nodes are misbehaving, yet are not reaching a BHP flooding attack. Therefore, 
node 3, due to its higher BHP flood rate, delays until node 9 transmits its data.  
The Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis (WEKA) tool was 
adopted to process the dataset using ML [56]. This tool is a Java-based open 
source, containing various methods related to ML, data mining, visulization, 
data filtering, and variable selection among others. For all considered ML 
algorithms, a 10-fold cross validation (10 fold-CV) method was employed during 
the training phase [56]. 10 fold-CV is a common testing method in ML that 
ensures the input dataset splits into 10 folds. The algorithm is then trained on 9 
folds, and evaluated against the remaining fold to generate the error rate. This 
procedure is repeated ten times, and all error rates are averaged to show the 
overall performance of the learning algorithm. The machine used to run all 
experiments is Intel® Xeon with 3.72 GHz 2 processors. 
A number of ML algorithms have been selected to counter the risk of BHP 
flood attacks by detecting misbehaving ingress nodes. In particular, Simple 
Logistic Regression, Naïve Bayes, RIDOR, SVM-Sequential Minimal 
Optimization (SVM-SMO), NN-MultilayerPerceptron, C4.5, AdaBoost, and 
Bagging [45, 48, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72]. We would like to evaluate the classification 
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systems’ predictive accuracies derived from the aforementioned ML algorithms 
on the BHP flood attack problem. The main metrics used in the ML algorithms’ 
comparisons are:  
1) Classification accuracy in % 
2) True Positives (TPs) and False Positives (FPs) 
3) Precision, Recall and Harmonic Mean (F-measure) 
4) Training time measured in milliseconds (ms) to build the classifiers  
5) Classifiers content for the rule induction, Bagging and tree based 
algorithms  
These evaluation measures mathematical descriptions are given below:  
   
  
     
               (16) 
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               (18) 
         
     
           
             (19) 
where TP is the number of data examples correctly classified by class A, TN is 
the number of data examples correctly classified by class -A, FP is the number of 
A’s examples incorrectly classified as -A, and FN is the number of -A examples 
incorrectly classified as A. 
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Prior to running the ML learning algorithms against the BHP flooding 
attacks dataset, we pre-processed the dataset using Correlation Features Sets 
(CFS) to determine the most influential features [57]. CFS is a well-known feature 
selection method which heuristically examines the correlation of each feature 
with the class label in order to discard any redundant or low correlated features. 
After running the CFS on the initial dataset, three features (Drop-Rate, 
Bandwidth-Use, BHP-Flood) were identified to be more effective to combat the 
BHP flood attack problem. Hence, we will utilize these features during the 
training phase for the classifiers.  
4.4 Results Analysis 
Figure 4.2 highlights the classification accuracies derived by the ML 
classifiers from the dataset. It is clear from the figure that the Bagging, rule 
induction (RIDOR), and decision tree (C4.5) classifiers have higher prediction 
rates than that of the remaining classifiers. Noticeably, the C4.5 algorithm 
outperformed the remaining algorithms when it comes to predictive accuracy. To 
be exact, its prediction accuracy is 4.66%, 14.52%, 20.84%, 1.68%, 26.42%, 39.07%, 
18.05% higher than those of RIDOR, Naïve Bayes, Simple Logistic Regression, 
Bagging, SVM-SMO, AdaBoost, and NN- MultilayerPerceptron, respectively. The 
superiority of C4.5 may be due to the intensive backward and forward pruning 
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implemented after constructing the tree. C4.5 trims sub-trees that lead to larger 
errors, replacing them with more accurate leaves, resulting in concise, yet highly 
predictive, classifiers. In addition, the C4.5 algorithm triggers an implicit 
discretization procedure based on Entropy, converting continuous variables into 
discrete ones prior to the training phase. This ensures small intervals for each 
continuous attribute, easing the data processing, and ensuring its efficiency. 
Finally, Bagging and RIROD classifiers seem competitive in the decision tree, 
both algorithms using effective pruning procedures to cut down the number of 
rules produced.  
Figure 4.3 displays the classifiers’ sizes for the top three predictive 
classifiers (C4.5, Bagging, RIDOR). It is clear from the figure that Bagging derives 
larger classifiers compared to both RIDOR and C4.5 algorithms. This is due to 
the generation of multiple local classifiers, and the integration step forming a 
Figure 4.2 Classification accuracies in % derived by the ML 
algorithms 
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final tree structure, which may lead to many branches and leaves. The classifier 
presented by RIDOR is the least predictive among those of the three algorithms, 
yet it contains a concise set of rules. For the user’s perspective, a more concise set 
of rules could make it easier for network administrators to understand and 
manually control the BHP flooding attack problem. C4.5, on the other hand, 
offers moderate-sized classifiers that have superiority in classification accuracy 
over RIDOR and Bagging respectively. In fact, C4.5 covered more training 
examples than RIDOR, discovering more rules that may contribute to the 
increase in predictive performance. 
Figures 4.4a - 4.4d show the true positives (TPs), false positives (FPs), true 
negatives (TNs) and false negatives (FNs) respectively for the considered 
algorithms on the BHP flood attack dataset. The TPs and TNs are consistent with 
the classification accuracy rates derived beforehand, in which C4.5, Bagging and 
Figure 4.3 The classifiers’ sizes of RIDOR, Bagging and C4.5 
algorithms 
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RIDOR achieved higher TPs than that of the remaining algorithms. For example, 
RIDOR correctly classified “Block”, “No Block” and “M- No Block” class labels 
without any error. However, for the hard-to-detect cases, i.e. the ones which 
belong to the “M-Wait” class, 28 instances have been misclassified by RIDOR as 
the “M=No Block” label. For the TNs results, AdaBoost algorithm seems have the 
rates because it was unable to clearly differentiate among the four class labels in 
particular M-Wait, which its instances have been completely misclassified to M-
No Block class label. 
Figure 4.4a The TPs of the 
ML algorithms 
 
Figure 4.4b The FPs of the 
ML algorithms 
 
Figure 4.4c The TNs of the 
ML algorithms 
 
Figure 4.4d The FNs of the 
ML algorithms 
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The results of the TPs, TNs, FNs and FPs show that “Block” and “No 
Block” cases are easy to detect by the ML algorithms, but cases that belong to 
class labels “M-Wait” and “M-No Block” are harder to be detected, due to 
overlaps between these two class labels. To be precise, in terms of FPs, the three 
least performed algorithms (AdaBoost, SVM-SMO, Logistic) are associated with 
300, 204, and 254 misclassifications respectively. These figures clearly reveal the 
reasons behind the low predictive rates of these three algorithms in detecting 
difficult-to-classify cases of “M-Wait” and “M-No Block”. To overcome this issue 
of overlapping between class labels, more data cases covering “M-No Block” and 
“M-Wait” are needed, so the ML algorithms can further distinguish between 
them during the learning phase. This is due to the fact that the misbehaving 
nodes are further decomposed in the dataset into three sub-class labels, in order 
to reflect the true nature of the problem and reduce overfitting during the 
learning phase. Moreover, and in terms of FNs, decision tree and Bagging 
algorithms consistently derived good results when compared with the remaining 
algorithms. To be exact, Bagging algorithm only wrongly classified 11 instances 8 
of which belong to the hard to classify class M-Wait. Typically, we do not desire 
to end up with a binary classification problem in which the ML algorithm 
decides whether the ingress node is behaving or misbehaving. However, we do 
aim to understand to which degree the node is misbehaving, and if two nodes 
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are misbehaving, which may be allowed to transmit data, and which should 
delay in using their flooding or network utilization rates. Therefore, it was 
necessary to further split the misbehaving class into multiple class labels during 
the data collection phase. 
Figure 4.5 shows three more types of measures: precision, recall, and F-
measure. The precision results displayed in Figure 4.5 shows a consistency with 
classification accuracy rates, and highlights that malicious ingress nodes are 
harder to be detected than behaving ingress nodes, at least for the dataset and 
algorithms used. Usually, high precision rates, such as in C4.5, RIDOR and 
Bagging, relate to their low FPs. C4.5 achieved the largest precision and 
AdaBoost the lowest. In the precision results, seven out of eight algorithms have 
consistent results when compared to their accuracies, except for the AdaBoost 
algorithm. The precision of AdaBoost declined significantly to 0.397 (39%) due to 
a large number of FP cases, as shown in Figure 4.5. Precision shows the number 
of correctly classified cases from all that have been classified. On the other hand, 
recall results in the same figure denotes the number of correctly classified cases 
in all cases intended to be correctly classified. In the recall results, all the ML 
algorithms have consistent results when compared to their predictive accuracies.  
To have a clearer insight into precision and recall alongside one another, 
we generated the scores when using the F1 measure. The F1 score takes the 
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weighted average of recall and precision (false negatives and false positives) into 
consideration, especially when involving data such as our four unevenly 
distributed class labels. In our study, we can observe that C4.5, RIDOR and 
Bagging still generate highly competitive F1 scores compared to the remaining 
considered algorithms on the BHP flood attack dataset.  
Lastly, Figure 4.6 depicts the runtime in millisecond (ms) taken from the ML 
algorithms in constructing the classifiers. Here, the fastest algorithms were Naïve Bayes 
and C4.5. Naive Bayes uses simple likelihood calculations for all variables in the test 
dataset using their frequencies in the training dataset, hence no rule learning being 
involved. Alternately, the C4.5 algorithm employs fast learning based on computing 
Entropy for the variables in the training dataset to build tree based classifiers. Hence, 
these two algorithms are quite efficient in building predictive classifiers in contrast to 
alternative ML algorithms. The MultilayerPerceptron NN algorithm was the slowest 
algorithm in building the classifier due to the exhaustive search this algorithm employs, 
Figure 4.5 The Precision, Recall and F1 scores of the ML algorithms   
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which is based on pre-setting the desired expected error achieved. This often necessitates 
repetitive training dataset scans. 
4.5 Studies Related to Application of Machine Learning in Detection and 
Classification Tasks 
Despite the scarcity of literature, this section highlights these studies and 
others related to primarily utilizing ML in different types of computer networks 
[40, 91, 92, 93, 35, 41].  
[40] investigated the problems of BHP flood attacks in OBS networks to 
differentiate the types of data bursts, i.e. congestion or contention. A new metric 
named “number of bursts between failures” (NBBF) was proposed to detect 
which type of data bursts losses occur. In the process of classifying these data 
bursts, the authors applied two methods: unsupervised expectation 
maximization (EM) and a supervised Hidden Markov Chain (HMC). Reported 
Figure 4.6 The time in ms needed to build the classifiers of the ML 
algorithms 
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results showed that when both methods are integrated, the accuracy of 
distinguishing among types of bursts losses is increased.  
[91] investigated the Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) flood attacks 
on the transport and application layers, and developed a detection mechanism 
that analyzes the traffic according to types of packets, packet arrival rate and 
server capacity. The detection mechanism relies on recording and monitoring 
information related to address pair (source and destination), the type of packet, 
the port addresses of the source and destination among others. The key to 
success of [91]’s method is the predefined setting value of the server capacity. No 
experiments have been conducted to reveal the pros and cons of the detection 
method of DDoS flood attacks.  
[92] investigated the problems of reducing flood attacks and other service 
attacks in computer networks using ML. These types of attacks normally belong 
to DDoS flooding attacks, and other risk that impair Internet security. The aim 
was to identify the misbehaving sources (nodes) in order to block their messages 
from their intended destinations. In the learning model proposed, elements of 
the network share behavior information about the network’s performance, so the 
classifier may amend or enhance the model’s behavior by blocking potentially 
detrimental messages. Reported experimental results revealed a 95% detection 
rate using a probabilistic classifier. 
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[93] reviewed different learning mechanisms utilized to detect DDoS 
flooding attacks, in particular, SYN flooding. This type of flooding attack harms 
the network performance: when packets flood the network, many users may 
suffer server access delays. In some cases, the server shuts down entirely from 
SYN flooding attacks. The authors of [93] critically analyzed different approaches 
related to ML, statistical analysis, and router based among others.  
[35] adopted the Naïve Bayes (NB) probabilistic classification algorithm 
[48] to detect the type of Internet traffic. Before applying NB, features related to 
traffic flow such as port identification, elapsed time between two consecutive 
flows, and the flow length among others, were collected. The type of traffic flow 
variable was assigned by a domain expert in the dataset, and NB was applied to 
generate probabilistic classification systems to predict the traffic flow variable. 
The classification system derived by NB shows low predictive rates, but when 
the authors utilized feature selection methods prior to the training phase, the 
accuracy rate of the classification systems was improved. 
The IP traffic classification problem was studied in the context of ML by 
[41]. The authors surveyed and compared the performance of supervised and 
unsupervised ML algorithms, and highlighted the role of feature assessment in 
pre-processing the IP traffic dataset. Results showed that NB, EM and decision 
tree algorithms often produce consistent results, with high classification accuracy 
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for the IP Internet traffic problem. Moreover, a number of recommendations 
have been highlighted based on the survey, such as: 
1) ML algorithms generate different results for the IP traffic problem because 
of the different learning mechanisms they employ in deriving the 
classification systems. Hence, hybrid learning seems appropriate for 
future investigation 
2) Different requirements are sought by ML algorithms because learning 
environments differ from one algorithm to another, as well as 
configurations  
3) It is essential to investigate real time learning, at least for the IP Internet 
traffic classification problem, in which the ML will, while in progress, 
derive the classifiers rather than using static datasets 
4) Feature selection methods can be useful in some Internet application 
problems such as IP Internet traffic classification 
The majority of recent research contends that utilizing ML techniques in 
computer networks relates to DDoS flood attacks using primarily adaptive 
distributed mechanisms, while other studies investigated data traffic analysis. 
This study investigates an entirely new issue – BHP flood attacks in OBS 
networks. We believe that ML has not yet been adopted to develop predictive 
models to counter BHP flood attacks in OBS networks.  
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4.6 Summary 
In spite of the many benefits of an OBS network, such as bandwidth 
efficiency, economic values and resiliency, OBS networks can become vulnerable 
when burst loss occurs during ingress nodes sending data, causing BHP flood 
attacks. This problem may deteriorate the overall network’s performance, due to 
the allocating of resources without proper usage. BHP flood attacks hinder the 
QoS of the OBS network, hence potentially causing a severe problem – the Denial 
of Service (DoS). This paper investigated the aforementioned issue by applying 
Machine Learning to automatically detect misbehaving ingress nodes, and 
blocking them in a preliminary stage. We evaluated various ML algorithms via 
simulation data, involving more than two ingress nodes and over 530 runs. The 
aim was to classify ingress nodes as accurately as possible, using variables 
related to their performance, such as packet drop rate, bandwidth used, and 
average delay time among others. Experimental results from a processed dataset 
related to BHP flood attacks showed that rule based classifiers, in particular 
decision trees (C4.5), Bagging, and RIDOR, consistently derive high predictive 
classifiers compared to alternate ML algorithms, including AdaBoost, Logistic 
Regression, Naïve Bayes, SVM-SMO and NN-MultilayerPerceptron. Moreover, 
the harmonic mean, recall and precision results of the rule based and tree 
classifiers were more competitive than those of the remaining ML algorithms. 
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Lastly, the runtime results measured in terms of millisecond showed that 
decision tree classifiers are not only more predictive, but are also more efficient 
than the rest of the algorithms. Thus, this is the most appropriate technique for 
classifying ingress nodes to combat the BHP flood attack problem. This paper is 
one of the initial attempts on adopting ML techniques to automatically classify 
ingress nodes in OBS networks. 
In the near future, we intend to build a new rule-based classifier using the 
decision tree, and embed it inside the simulator to detect misbehaving nodes 
during the simulation phase. 
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